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HOW THE EAST WAS WON: A CRITIQUE OF U.S.
TACTICS IN NEGOTIATING PATENT PROTECTION
FOR PHARMACEUTICALS IN THAILAND
Michael Beggt
Abstract: In February 1992, Thailand amended its patent law to provide patent
protection for drugs. The amendment resulted from pressure by the United States
pharmaceutical industry and the United States Trade Representative; it was not a Thai
internal policy decision. Bleak prospects in the U.S. drug market due to a climate of
increasing restraints on drug prices have led the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association to push for patent protection for their products abroad. Consequently, the
United States Trade Representative pressured Thailand to amend its Patent Act to
include pharmaceuticals, threatening to use Section 337 of the Trade and Tariff Act of
1930 and Section 301 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1974 against it, and threatening the
revocation of GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) benefits. This Comment
examines the tactics employed by the United States between 1988 and 1992 in its
negotiations with Thailand for patent protection for pharmaceuticals and the
assumptions underlying those tactics. The evidence indicates that Thailand may not yet
be economically, structurally and socially ready for drug patent protection and the step
toward industrialization it represents. The Comment further concludes that the United
States' tactics do not accord with a rational concept of trade negotiations, and are likely
to harm its interests in the long term by injuring its relationship with Thailand.
Moreover, the United States' moral claims with regard to the necessity of patent
protections are unjustified. The Comment suggests that a truly multilateral resolution of
international drug patent problems is appropriate and proposes that the World
Intellectual Property Organization be reconsidered in that regard in future patent
protection negotiations with Thailand and other developing countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the United States has seen its position in
the global economy change. Trading partners such as Germany, Japan and
the European Economic Community threaten to replace the United States as
the world's economic leader, while smaller, still-developing countries such as
those in Southeast Asia are cutting into the U.S. share of the world market for
goods and services. As a consequence, the American people, industry and
government are beginning to reassess their position.1
t B.A., 1991 University of Victoria; LL.B. candidate 1993, University of Victoria, Victoria, British
Columbia, Canada. The author wishes to thank Professor Ted McDorman for his encouragement and
assistance in the preparation of this Comment, and Tilleke & Gibbins R.O.P., Advocates and Solicitors,
Bangkok, Thailand, for their kind provision of additional research materials.
See Elizabeth Uphoff, Intellectual Property and U.S. Relations with Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand 8 (Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1991). Ms. Uphoff explains that
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Powerfiul U.S. industries have pressured Congress and the President to
enact protectionist legislation. One of the most powerful of these lobby
groups is the U.S. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA). PMA
member corporations have become concerned about declining profits
resulting from the recent trend toward drug price regulation in North America
and elsewhere. 2 Their response has been to push for complete patent
protection in countries, such as Thailand, that protect medicine product
patents not at all or to a degree that does not satisfy the PMA. Other private
U.S. and international organizations have taken up the cause; in the past
decade the United States government has become the champion of
organizations that depend on intellectual property protection for their profits.3
Toward the end of increasing patent protection in its intellectual property
markets around the world, the United States has said it will revoke
preferential treatment for non-compliant countries, enacted protectionist trade
legislation and forced intellectual property issues into the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 4 The United States has targeted Thailand for
such tactics on the issue of drug patents. Four avenues were open to the
United States in trying to bring drugs under Thailand's patent law:
unilaterally enforced demands, bilateral trade negotiations, the multilateral
trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round of the GATT, and negotiations
within the existing forum for international intellectual property agreements,
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The United States
government, in effect if not in appearance, has adopted the unilateral
approach, a strategy that has been described as aggressive unilateralism.
Thus far, the United States has not quite achieved the desired level of drug
patent protection in Thailand, but most of its demands are being met. The
United States government will no doubt consider this evidence of a successful
Since the 1970s, the domestic consensus on free trade has been called increasingly
into question... the perceived role of the government in the success in Japan and the
East Asian countries has raised doubts about the continued validity of liberal trade
theory. The recession in 1981-82, followed by an unprecedented trade deficit, even in
manufactured goods, brought considerable pressure on Congress to do something to
relieve suffering industries and make America competitive again.
2 See note 28 and accompanying text.
3 Although the United States is not the only country pressuring Thailand and other developing
countries to strengthen their intellectual property laws, the United States has spearheaded the
international pressures on developing countries in the past decade, especially in the case of Thailand.
This comment, therefore, focuses on the U.S. position as representative.
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 61 Stat A3, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS
187 (1948).
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strategy; the tactics the United States has resorted to, however, may
unnecessarily damage its long-term relationship with Thailand.5
This Comment critiques the tactics that the United States has employed
in seeking to establish its own brand of patent protection for pharmaceuticals
in Thailand. The discussion first examines the development of the United
States government's position on obtaining patent protection for
pharmaceuticals in Thailand. The U.S. position comprises two elements: the
tactics it has employed in negotiations and its justifications for seeking to
force changes in the Thai Patent Act. These tactics and the arguments
advanced by commentators and officials to justify their use in seeking patent
protection are then evaluated in light of Thailand's current economy,
infrastructure and culture. Several conclusions are drawn from the foregoing
analysis. The United States is pressuring Thailand to enact patent protection
for which it is not yet economically, structurally or culturally prepared. In
doing so, the United States has violated concepts of moral rights and trade
liberalization that it claims to hold, and may have jeopardized its own
interests by damaging its trading relationship with Thailand for a relatively
minor, short-term gain. The Comment concludes with the observation that
instead of pursuing bilateral agreements or a GATT agreement on intellectual
property protection, the United States could promote its long-term interests
more effectively by concentrating on developing an uncoerced international
consensus on intellectual property, and enlarging the scope and power of the
existing multilateral body on intellectual property, the World Intellectual
Property Organization.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. POSMON
A. Thailand's Patent Law and Pharmaceuticals
Thailand first began to consider patent legislation in 1931, the year it
joined the Beme Convention. 6 A draft patent act was considered in that
5 For a demonstration of Congress' insistence on taking whatever measures are necessary to gain
entry to foreign markets, see Trade Policy: New U.S. Trade Law Is Protectionist, European Community
Tells GA7T Council, 5 Intl Trade Rep 1302 (Sept 28, 1988); Unfair Trade Practices: USTR Defends
Administration'sNaming OfJapan, India. Brazil Under Super 301, 6 Intl Trade Rep 684 (May 31, 1989);
Unfair Trade Practices: U.S. Special 301 Process Undermining GA77. Hurts U.S. Credibility, Brazil
Official Says, 6 Intl Trade Rep 845 (June 28, 1989); Intellectual Property: USTR Should Consider
Revoking India's GSP Benefits to Protect Patents, Baucus Says, 9 Intl Trade Rep 455 (Mar 11, 1992);
Baucus Calls 511 Talks A Failure, Presses USTR To Set Number Targets, 9 Intl Trade Rep 494 (Mar 18,
1992).6 The Bemne Convention for the Protection of Literay and Artistic Works of 1886, September 9,
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year,7 but the country did not pass its first patent legislation until forty-eight
years later.8
Based on the model proposed by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WLPO), 9 which Thailand joined recently, 10 the 1979 Patent Act
protected new inventions for fifteen years, and new product designs for seven
years. 11  The Act also featured a compulsory licensing system. 12  Most
importantly to the PMA, Section 9 of the 1979 Act excluded pharmaceutical
products and ingredients from patent protection. 13
In February 1992, after a protracted legislative struggle, 14 Thailand
1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, as revised, LNTS 123/233, Can TS (1931) No 3, 77 BFSP 22,
168 CTS 185 ("Berne Convention"). This Convention covers literary and artistic works. See Patents
pending, Business in Thailand 43 (Dec 1979).
7 1931 also saw the enactment of new copyright legislation (Act for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, BE 2474 (1931)) and Thailand's first trademark law (Trademark Act of Thailand, BE
2472 (1931)).
8 Patent Act, BE 2522 (1979) ("1979 Patent Act"). See also Srisanit Anek at 89; and Patents
pending, Business in Thailand 43 (Dec 1979).
9 The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 UST
1749, TIAS No. 6932, 828 UNTS 3. Organized in 1963, WIPO administers the major international
agreements on intellectual property, including the Berne Convention and the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, March 20, 1883, as revised, UST 1583, TIAS No 6923, 828
UNTS 305 ("Paris Convention"). WIPO also promotes intellectual property protection by providing
technical and educational support to its members.
10 Thailand accedes to WIPO Convention, IP Asia 15 (February 8, 1990). As of this writing,
Thailand has not yet joined the Paris Convention, which covers trademarks and patents.
11 Srisanit Anek at 9-95; see also Thomas N. O'Neill III, Intellectual Property Protection in
Thailand: Asia's Young Tiger and Amnerica's 'Growing' Concern, 11 U Pa J Intl Bus L 603, 609 (1990).
The terms begin on the filing of a patent application.
12 Srisanit Anek at 89-95. The system makes licensing compulsory in three situations: (1) where
there has been no production of the product or use of the process in Thailand within three years from the
patent date; (2) where the patented product has not been sold in Thailand; and (3) where the product has
been sold at excessive prices or the sales do not fulfill the demand for the product.
13 Id. See also Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, The International Movement on Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights and GA TT: An Analysis of Thailand's Position, 29 Mal L Rev 329, 333 n 17 (1987). The
relevant provision of section 9 stipulates as follows:
The following inventions are not patentable:
(1) food, beverage or pharmaceutical products;...
As Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai points out, there is some question whether section 9 excludes drug
processes as well as products. See generally Julio Noguds, Patents and Pharnaceutical Drugs:
Understanding the Pressures on Developing Countries, 24:6 J World Trade 81, 83 (1990).
14 See Patent protection for phannaceuticals-USTR accepts PMA's petition, IP Asia 22 (Apr 25,
1991). The political coup of February 23, 1991 forced the government to resubmit the Patent Act
amendments to the National Legislative Assembly. Even after they were submitted a second time, there
was difficulty. The patent amendments bill "won overwhelming approval on its first reading" on
November 8, 1991, but was then "stalled by the opposition of the Public Health Ministry, which [had] the
support of local drug companies, academics, and physicians' and pharmacists' associations." Thailand
Attempts to Approve Patent Bill to Head Off Future U.S. Trade Sanctions, 9 Intl Trade Rep 64 (Jan 8,
1992).
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passed amendments to the 1979 Act.15 These amendments extend protection
to pharmaceutical products and increase patent term from fifteen to twenty
years. 16 However, the amendments do not protect drugs invented and tested
but not yet approved for use in Thailand, the so-called pipeline drugs.17 The
amendments also include a compulsory licensing scheme designed to prevent
patent holders from exploiting their monopoly power, and a special
Pharmaceutical Patent Board to supervise drug patenting.' 8 The immediate
reaction of the United States government and the pharmaceutical industry was
disapproval. 19 These changes are the result of the U.S. pressure discussed
infra.20
B. Private Sector Pressure
The U.S. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association has led the efforts
to apply pressure on Thailand to enact strict patent laws.21 The PMA
persuaded the United States government to take up its cause, and rallied
support from other private sector groups and governments to push for
stronger intellectual property protection throughout the world in response to a
claimed steady decline in profits.22 Critics complain that for 30 years the
15 See Pornpimol Kanchanalak, US to press new govt to amend patent law, Bangkok Post Weekly
Rev 4 col 2 (Mar 27, 1992). The amendments took effect on October 1, 1992, 180 days after publication
in the Thai Government Gazette. See Peter Mytri Ungphakorn, Patent bill: weighing the pros and cons,
Bangkok Post (Feb 27, 1992).
16 See Pornpimol Kanchanalak, US to press new govt to amend patent law, Bangkok Post Weekly
Rev 4 col 2 (Mar 27, 1992); and Intellectual Property: ThailandAttempts to Approve Patent Bill to Head
OffFuture US. Trade Sanctions, 9 Intl Trade Rep 64 (Jan 8, 1992).
17 1d.
18 Id.
19 Pornpimol Kanchanalak, US to press new govt to amend patent law, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 4
col 2 (Mar 27, 1992); and Intellectual Property: USTR FindsAgainst Thailand On Patents, Delays Action
UntilAfler Thai Election, 9 Intl Trade Rep 478 (Mar 18, 1992).
20 See II.C.3.b., Section 301 Pressure on Thailand infra.
21 In Thailand, the Pharmaceutical Products Association (Thailand), a group representing foreign
drug companies, and the American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand issued a "white paper" on August
23, 1985 titled Patent Protection and the Pharmaceutical Industry in Thailand. See American
businessmen issue 'White Paper', The Nation (Aug 24, 1985). The paper pushed for amendments to
Section 9 of the Patent Act, warning that if patents are not issued for drug products, "eventually no new
foreign-developed drugs will reach Thailand" because foreign pharmaceutical companies will be forced
out of Thailand. Id. The goal of this paper, it would seem. was to persuade the Thai public to support
patents for drugs.
22 For a description of the efforts of the private sector lobby groups in the Uruguay Round of the
GATT talks, see Carol J. Bilzi, Towards an Intellectual Property Agreement in the GA 7T: View from the
Private Sector, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 343 (1989). The U.S. group is the Intellectual Property
Committee (IPC). Among the twelve corporations that comprise IPC are Bristol-Myers (now
Bristol-Myers-Squibb), DuPont, Johnson & Johnson, Merck and Co. and Pfizer, all of which produce
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brand name drug makers "have enjoyed the fattest profits in big business."23
The pharmaceutical industry is suffering from a "trend ... where the profits
of the R&D-intensive pharmaceutical industry are squeezed by the double
effect of government regulations and generic drug competition" in the
domestic market.24  Patent protection, claim drug manufacturers, provides
the necessary incentive to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on research
and development each year. The people who need the drugs counter,
however, that patents make the drugs unavailable to most people by making
them expensive and raise the cost of health insurance, both public and private.
The result has been a trend toward drug price regulation in the United
States and other countries.25 Insurance companies have begun to encourage
doctors to prescribe alternative or generic drugs when they are available. The
old system, whereby a patent on a prescription drug remained effective long
after the patent expired because of prescribing inertia, 26 is being replaced by
patented pharmaceuticals. IPC was formed six months before the Punta del Este declaration commencing
the Uruguay Round. IPC worked "closely with members of Congress and their staffs" (ld at 344) to
promote bilateral talks on intellectual property protection, and with Japanese (the Keidanren) and
European (UNICE, or Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe) lobby groups to
promote an international consensus on intellectual property protection. As part of their efforts, the three
groups submitted to the participants in the Uruguay Round a 100-page proposal entitled Basic
Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Properly. Id at 347. See also David Hartridge and
Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Properly Rights: The Issues in GATT, 22 Vand J Transnatl L 893, 896
(1989 Brian O'Reilly, Drugmakers Under Attack, 124 Fortune 48 (July 29, 1991). See also OECD, The
Pharmaceutical Industry: Trade Related Issues 36-38 (OECD, 1985).
24 Nogu~s, 24:6 J World Trade 81, 98 (cited in note 13).
25 O'Reilly, 124 Fortune 48 at 60. This trend and the election of Bill Clinton as President have
resulted in the major drug companies voluntarily limiting price increases to the inflation rate, in the hope
of averting mandatory price controls. See Joseph Weber, A bitterpill to swallow, Business Week 42 (Nov
16, 1992) and Jane H. Cutaia, Swallowing a bitter pill, Business Week 82 (Jan 11, 1993). At the moment,
President Clinton's health reform program is focused on "'managed competition,' which relies on large
purchasing cooperatives to bargain down the cost of medical care," so price controls are not yet
anticipated. But if the new administration's goals of capping annual spending on health care while also
providing health insurance to the tens of millions of uninsured Americans cannot be reconciled, "he may
have to resort to mandatory price controls." Susan B. Garland and Mike McNamee, Clinton's risky faith
in a health-care fix, Business Week 35 (February 8, 1993). Some early signs indicate a willingness to
grapple with drug prices directly. See Murray Campbell, Clinton takes a shot at drug industry, The
[Toronto] Globe & Mail Al (February 13, 1993); see also Hillary Clinton to Head Panel on Health Care,
NY Times Al, A20 col 6 (Jan 26, 1993), and Ann Reilly Dowd, His First 100 Days: The Outlook for
Business, Fortune 41, 46-47 (Nov 30, 1992). In Canada, for example, along with the granting of
pharmaceutical patent protection in 1987 came the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, the goal of
which is to curtail increases in prices of patented drugs and to try to keep the prices of new patented drugs
within reasonable bounds. Its powers are set out in the Patent Act, RSC 1985, ch P-3, as amended RSC
1985, ch P-33 (3d Supp) § 15 (proclaimed in force Dec 7, 1987 by SI/88-1), at §§ 39.25 and 39.26, and
Regulation (concerning patented medicine prices) SOR/88-474. The Canadian Patent Regulations also
provide for payments to provinces to promote research and development of drugs. SOR/88-167.
26 "Prescribing inertia" means that doctors do not become acquainted with generic equivalents of the
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a system in which insurance companies are teaching doctors about the
lower-cost alternatives in the market.27  At the same time, the U.S.
companies have no "blockbuster" drugs on their way to market. Thus, while
at present they are earning large profits, the next ten to twenty years could
prove to be a "hangover" for the drug companies. 28
Sensing the changing attitude of U.S. legislators toward drug patents
and pricing in the United States, the PMA has begun to direct its efforts at
procuring stronger patent protection in other countries, primarily developing
countries such as Thailand, but also including countries such as Canada.
These efforts have included lobbying Congress to negotiate bilaterally and in
the GATT, and private lobbying in individual countries and at the GATT
talks. 29 At stake are billions of dollars in revenue.30 Canada, for example,
agreed to a compromise in 1987 (shorter patent term and the Patented
Medicine Prices Review Board to help keep drug prices in line), 31 and
brand name drugs they have been prescribing for many years. They continue to prescribe the brand name
drug, oblivious to its cost. Even when doctors switch a patient from drug to drug, they pay no attention to
what the new drug costs. Thus, the pharmaceutical market is unique: the decision-makers do not care
about prices. U.S. Senator Pryor and others are pushing for price controls, and for a law allowing
pharmacists to substitute a cheaper drug for the one named on the prescription. Moreover, the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act became law in 1984 (Pub L No 98-417, 98 Stat 1585 (Sept
24, 1984)). It reduces the FDA approval requirement from duplicate clinical testing to simply showing
that the generic product meets the same standard as the original. So generic drugs enter the market much
sooner after patent expiry. See O'Reilly, 124 Fortune 48 at 58 and 60 (cited in note 23). The drug
companies, of course, have responded by maligning generic copies as dangerous and untested.
27 O'Reilly, 124 Fortune 48 at 60 (cited in note 23). This activity will likely be bolstered by the
Clinton administration's planned health reforms, which emphasize the provision of health insurance to all
Americans and greater control over government health expenditures. The government is likely to become
more involved in health insurance, and with its emphasis on deficit reduction it will probably put
considerable pressure on doctors and pharmacists to pay more attention to the cost of the drugs they
prescribe. See Ann Reilly Dowd, His First 100 Days: The Outlook for Business, Fortune 41 at 46-47
(Nov 30, 1992); and Murray Campbell, Clinton takes shot at drug industry, The [Toronto] Globe & Mail
AI (February 13, 1993).
28 O'Reilly, 124 Fortune 48 at 60 and 63 (cited in note 23); see also Joseph Weber & Mark
Maremont, Drugmakers: Prescribing for the Hangover to Come, Business Week 54 (15 July 1991);
Joseph Weber, A Bitter Pill to Swallow, Business Week 42 (Nov 16, 1992); Jane H. Cutaia, Swallowing a
Bitter Pill, Business Week 82 (Jan 11, 1993).
29 See Bilzi, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 343 (see note 22 and accompanying text). Certain PMA
members have promoted their interest in patent protection internationally through the Intellectual
Property Committee, which has a mandate to promote the protection of all forms of intellectual property.
30 Harvey Bale, PMA senior Vice President for International Affairs, has claimed that U.S. drug
companies lose "about five billion dollars per year in lost sales due to inadequate patent and trademark
protection worldwide." News Highlights. 9 Intl Trade Rep 49 (Jan 8, 1992). In Thailand, the PMA
estimates that its members annually lose nineteen million dollars (484.5 million baht) in sales due to
"patent piracy." Porpimol Kanchanalak, US to press new govt to amend patent law, Bangkok Post
Weekly Rev 4 col 2 (Mar 27, 1992).
31 See note 25.
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numerous other countries have begun to reform their patent laws. 32 The PMA
continues to work on extending effective patent term33 in the industrialized
countries, but lately has put enormous effort into trying to establish patent
protection in countries like Thailand. The pressure has not diminished,
notwithstanding the amendments to Thailand's patent law that were passed in
February of 1992.34
Private sector pressure from these companies was not enough to sway
the Thai government, however. The promise of technology transfer and
incentives for innovation held out by the PMA did not, from the Thai point of
view, outweigh the benefits of free technology and low drug prices they enjoy
without stringent patent protection.35 Undeterred, the PMA lobbyists took
advantage of protectionist sentiment in Congress and sought support from the
United States government. As a result, the "bilateral" talks between Thailand
and the United States began, while Congress began to seek ways to apply
pressure unilaterally.
C. United States Government Pressure
In the past decade of trade negotiations with Thailand, the United
States government has relied on the threat of three sanctions available to it
under strengthened trade laws: (a) removal of Thailand's preferred status
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) system; (b) an embargo
pursuant to Section 33736 on the importation of Thai goods that infringe U.S.
intellectual property laws; and (c) the ultimate unilateral trade sanction,
32 For a survey of recent changes in the ASEAN countries, see Cristoph Antons, Intellectual
Property in ASEAN Countries: A Survey, 3 Eur Intell Prop Rev 79 (1991).
33 Effective patent term, in the case of drugs, refers to the period during which the final product is
on the market and under patent. In the United States, health protection regulation (through the
requirement of FDA approval of new drugs) and drug company clinical trials delay the release of a new
drug by an average often years from the initial patent application, thus reducing the effective patent term
to roughly seven years, since the U.S. patent term is seventeen years from the date of patent grant. See
Noguds, 24:6 J World Trade 81 at 92-93 and 100 (cited in note 13); and Peter C. Richardson, The Need
For Adequate and Effective Protection of Intellectual Property: Perspective of the Private
Sector-Patents, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 352, 354 (1989). Richardson indicates that most of Europe has a
similar effective term.
34 See Porpimol Kanchanalak, US to press new govt to amend patent law, Bangkok Post Weekly
Rev 4 col 2 (Mar 27, 1992)(see text accompanying note 151).
35 For an example of Thai concern about higher drug prices resulting from patent protection of
drugs, see P. Gorton, Bangkok has become the fake-Gucci, phoney--Rolex capital of the world, The
[Montreal] Gazette B4 (May 21, 1989).
36 Originally enacted in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1930, ch 497, 46 Stat 590 (June 17, 1930)
("Trade Act of 1930"), codified at 19 USC § 1337 (1992).
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Section 301.37 All three options are discussed infra; Section 301, however,
has been the primary tool in negotiating patent protection for drugs in
Thailand.
1. Generalized System of Preferences Status
The developed countries have set up a system of trade preferences for
certain developing countries known as the Generalized System of
Preferences. 38  As one writer describes it, this system allows certain
developing countries to "import selected commodities duty--free in order to
encourage developing country national progress."39 Inclusion in the U.S. list
of GSP countries depends on two sets of criteria: mandatory criteria that
define ineligible countries, 40 and discretionary criteria chosen by the
President.41 The Trade Act of 198442 added intellectual property protection
to both the mandatory43 and discretionary criteria.44
The threat of removal from the GSP list was exercised in the
mid-1980s when the United States Trade Representative (USTR)45 identified
Thailand as a country that had failed to protect adequately the intellectual
37 Trade and Tariff Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-618, 88 Stat 2041 (Jan 3, 1975) ("Trade Act of
1974' codified in 19 USC §§ 2411-2420 (1992).
A For an overview of the origins of the GSP, see Edmond McGovern, International Trade
Regulation: GA77, the United States and the European Community (Exeter Globefield, 1982) at 211; and
C. Pestiau and J. Henry, Non-tariff Barriers as a Problem in International Development 39 (The
Canadian Economic Policy Committee, 1972), reprinted in John H. Jackson, ed, Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text on the National and International
Regulation of Transnational Economic Relations 1009 (West Publishing, 1977).
39 O'Neill, 11 U Pa J Intl Bus L 603 at 612 n 68 (cited in note 11).
40 19 USC § 2462(b)(1)-(7) (cited in note 36). Those ineligible are (1) Conunnist countries, (2)
OPEC members, (3) countries that treat preferentially developed countries other than the United States, to
the detriment of the United States, (4) countries that nationalize U.S. property, (5) nations that do not
enforce international arbitral awards in favor of the United States, (6) countries that aid or harbor an
international terrorist group, and (7) states that do not adequately protect worker rights, which are defined
in 19 USC § 2462(d).
41 19 USC § 2462(c).
42 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-573, 98 Stat 2948 (Oct 30, 1984) ("Trade Act of
1984'- 19 USC § 2462(b)(4)(A). This provision deals with nationalizing U.S. property. The change was
to specifically include patents, trademarks and copyright in the meaning of property.
44 19 USC § 2462(c)(5). This amendment has been described as a switch from an altruistic system,
designed to "extend advantages to developing countries" and thereby "promote world trade, encourage
poor countries to sell to richer nations and lessen trade imbalances," to a system "intended to prompt
developing countries to adopt policies that served US economic interests." Thailand gains little from US
duty exemption-bank report, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 18 (Nov 9, 1990).
45 The USTR is the primary administrative body for the enforcement of U.S. international trade law.
The USTR was established by Pub L 97-456, 96 Stat 2505 (Jan 12, 1983) and is codified at 19 USC §
2171. Its relevant powers and duties are set out infra.
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property of United States nationals. 46 The Reagan Administration demanded
that Thailand change its laws by December 15, 1988.47 The Thai government
responded by submitting amendments to the Thai Copyright Act to the
National Legislative Assembly.48 Opposition to the proposed changes was
immediate and the resulting furor led to an election, out of which came a new
coalition government. 49 The pressure on the Thai government from industry,
academics and the general public Was great. Many Thais opposed any
"unpatriotic caving-in to U.S. demands." 50 There was also opposition on the
merits of the proposed changes, particularly in the drug patent area. 5 1
Consequently, the new government, led by Prime Minister Chatichai
Choonhavan, made no "attempt to resuscitate the Copyright Bill," and was
unwilling to address the issue of drug patents until the completion of the
Uruguay Round of the GATT talks.52 Because Prime Minister Chatichai
refused to acquiesce to its demands, the United States cut $165 million of
Thailand's GSP benefits53 and threatened to curtail other trade benefits. 54
46 O'Neill, 11 U Pa J Intl Bus L 603 at 606 (cited in note 11).
47 The U.S. demands concerned copyright, trademarks and patents. The patent-related demands
made were for protection of food and beverages, agricultural machinery, and pharmaceuticals and
pharmaceutical ingredients; a longer term of protection to twenty years; milder compulsory licensing
provisions; and the removal or loosening of the requirement that the patent holder work the invention in
Thailand. See USTR's report: 1P rights, IP Asia 19 (Apr 19, 1990).
48 O'Neill, 11 U Pa J Intl Bus L 603 at 617 (cited in note 11).
49 See Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, Thailand and International Trade Law 25 (1987), and O'Neill, 11
U Pa J Intl Bus L 603 at 617-22 (cited in note 11).
50 O'Neill, 11 U Pa J Intl Bus L 603 at 621 (cited in note 11). O'Neill points out that most of the
debate focused on the international power politics at work, rather that the merits of the proposed changes
to the law. On this point he cites Surin Pitsuwan, Copyright Bill Now More of A 'Political Plaything',
Bangkok Post 6 (Apr 28, 1988); and Surin Pitsuwan, Democrat MP Recounts Battle Over Copyright,
Bangkok Post 2 (Apr 30, 1988).
51 The Thai Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association argued that drug product patents would lead
to foreign takeover of the Thai market, which would in turn lead to higher prices and inaccessibility of
drugs to the poor. USTR names India, Thailand and PRC as priorily foreign countries, IP Asia 11 (May
30, 1991); Patent protection, IP Asia 20 (February 14, 1991).
52 Chavalit Uttasart, Impasse on 1P protection, IP Asia 17 (Mar 17, 1989).
53 The announcement was made on Jan 19, 1989. O'Neill, 11 U Pa J Intl Bus L 603 at 606 (cited in
note 11); and GSP: President Reagan Denies Thailand Larger GSP Benefits, Citing Intellectual Property
Record, 6 Intl Trade Rep 96 (Jan 25, 1989). See also USTR, The 1992 National Trade Estimate Report
on Foreign Trade Barriers 241 (USTR, 1992) ("National Trade Estimate" or "NTE"). The Trade
Representative here states that "the U.S. government has denied Thailand up to $644 million in GSP
benefits through 1990." Id.
54 O'Neill, II U Pa J Intl Bus L 603 at 606, n 24, 612-614 and 616 (cited in note 11). Benefits were
reduced pursuant to 19 USC § 2464(a)(1), which allows the President to "withdraw, suspend or limit"
duty free treatment to a beneficiary developing country. The provision specifies that, in making such a
decision, the President may consider the factors in §§ 2461 and 2462(c), including § 2462(c)(5), viz., the
extent to which the country has adequate and effective intellectual property protection for foreign
nationals.
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While in the past three years these bilateral talks have intensified,55 the
United States is relying less and less on its GSP leverage. 56 Instead, possible
retaliatory trade measures, particularly pursuant to Section 301, are being
relied on to pressure Thailand.5
7
2. Section 337 of the Trade and TariffAct of 1930
Section 337 was changed recently to make it a powerful potential
negotiating tool in bilateral discussions. 58 This change is one of the United
States government's efforts to strengthen its retaliatory trade law arsenal.
While the United States government has not yet taken formal action against
Thailand under this provision, it empowers the U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC) 59 to investigate foreign products that infiinge U.S. patents
55 Thanes Periera and Rebecca Rungsang, Thailand: Protection for Pharmaceuticals, IP Asia 4 at 7
(Oct 19, 1989).
56 The USTR recently recommended "that President Bush extend benefits to Thailand under the
GSP, but for less than a year and pending changes in Thailand's stance on workers' rights"; thus it appears
that the USTR is focusing on Section 301 as its source of intellectual property pressure and is using the
GSP to promote worker rights. Pornpimol Kanchanalak, U.S. likely to extend GSP benefits for Thailand,
Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 14 (May 8, 1992). See also GSP: Hills Announces Acceptance of 1991 GSP
Petitions, 8 Intl Trade Rep 1288 (Aug 28, 1991); and GSP: AFL-CIO Opposes Benefits For Nations That
Allegedly Violate Worker Rights, 8 Intl Trade Rep 1462 (Oct 9, 1991).
57 The Trade Representative referred to Section 301 measures during the announcement of the
revocation of GSP benefits: "[i]f there are not significant changes in Thailand's policies in the next few
months, it is my view that Thailand should be designated a priority foreign country under the 1988 trade
act." GSP: President Reagan... 6 Intl Trade Rep 96 (Jan 25, 1989). Note that these trade measures,
although authorized under Section 301, may include a change in Thailand's GSP status. After Thailand
was again cited as a priority foreign country (see note 151 and accompanying text), a representative of the
International Intellectual Property Alliance stated that "Thailand's GSP status is very precarious. If no
progress is being made by Thailand, we will recommend under special 301 provisions a total withdrawal
of GSP benefits and additional sanctions." Pompimol Kanchanalak, New complaints keep Thais on list for
U.S. trade action, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 11 (May 8, 1992). Recent events indicate that GSP cuts may
be used against Thailand. The USTR recently cut India's GSP benefits, largely because of the country's
failure to "adequately" protect drug patents. Moreover, former Trade Representative Carla Hills stated
that revoking GSP benefits for Thailand "would certainly be an option." See Intellectual Property: USTR
Cites India, Taiwan, Thailand As Worst Intellectual Property Offenders, 9 Intl Trade Rep 784 (May 6,
1992).
58 19 USC § 1337 (cited in note 36). For an analysis of the recent changes and of Section 337 in
general, see Nathan G. Knight, Section 337 and the GAT. A Necessary Protection or an Unfair Trade
Practice? 18 Ga J Intl & Comp L 47 (1988). See also Kenneth E. Krosin and Holly D. Kozlowski,
Patent-Based Suits at the International Trade Commnission Following the 1988 Amendments to Section
337, 2 Eur Intell Prop Rev 58 (1990); and John W. Rogers III, The Demise of Section 337's
GA7T-Legality, 8 Eur Intell Prop Rev 275 (1990).
59 The ITC is the agency that investigates alleged unfair import practices, including Section 337
actions. See Krosin and Kozlowski, 2 Eur Intell Prop Rev 58 n 8. It was established by the Trade Act of
1930, and is codified at 19 USC § 1330 (1992). The ITC's powers and responsibilities are set out at 19
USC §§ 1331-41.
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or other intellectual property laws.60 It may do so on its own initiative or in
response to complaints from patent holders.61 In practice, "[p]atent-based
Section 337 actions are usually initiated by the filing of a complaint by the
U.S. patent owner."62 Section 337 is not simply a private remedy, however.
It stands alongside traditional patent infiingement remedies.63 It relieves the
private company of the burden of enforcing its patent by permitting the
government to step in and protect U.S. companies from "international
thievery." 64
That was the phrase used by President Reagan when he signed into law
the 1988 amendments to the Trade Act of 1930.65 The amendments
established a separate category for intellectual property violations.
Previously, in any action under Section 337, the complainant had to prove
five elements:
(1) unfair acts or methods of competition
(2) in the importation of goods into, or sale of goods
in, the United States,
(3) the effect or tendency of which is to destroy
or substantially injure
(4) a United States industry
(5) that is efficiently and economically operated. 66
All but the fifth element are still required for complaints unrelated to
intellectual property. 67  Under the amended version, however, the
complainant must now prove only three elements for a patent complaint:
(1) goods that infringe the patent of a U.S. patent owner;
(2) the importation of the goods into, or sale of goods
60 19 USC § 1337(b)(1).
611Id.
62 Krosin and Kozlowski, 2 Eur Intell Prop Rev 58 at 60 (cited in note 59).
63 A private action for patent infringement may be undertaken in addition to a Section 337
investigation. 19 USC § 1337(a)(1).
64 President Reagan Signs Trade Bill Into Law, Saying Nation Now Speaks With One Voice, 5 Intl
Trade Rep 1184 (Aug 24, 1988).
65 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-418, 102 Stat 1107 (Aug 23,
1988) ("Trade Act of 1988").
66 Rogers, 8 Eur Intell Prop Rev 275 (cited in note 58). See 19 USC § 1337(a) (1987), which also
prohibits, in the alternative to (3) and (4) in the list above, acts the effect of which is "to restrain or
monopolize trade and commerce in the United States."67 19 USC § 1337(a)(1)(A).
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in, the United States;
(3) a U.S. (domestic) industry.68
Importation or sale is broadly defined in the legislation, 69 and the 1988
amendments explicitly deem a U.S. industry to exist even where there is mere
ownership or licensing of patent rights,70 reversing previous ITC policy.
71
Unchanged are the time limits and remedies. The ITC must complete
each investigation and issue a final order within 12 months of the start of the
investigation.72 In cases that the ITC determines to be "complicated," the
time limit is 18 months. 73 If the Commission finds that Section 337 has been
violated, it may choose one or both of two types of remedy: a permanent
exclusion order, either general (no person shall import the infringing article)
or limited (the respondents in this case shall not import the infiinging
article), 74 and a cease and desist order.75 Section 337 is a powerful tool for
limiting access to the U.S. market, and its recent changes respecting patent
claims are another indication of how successful the PMA lobby has been in
influencing U.S. trade law.76
68 19 usc § 1337(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2).
69 Krosin and Kozlowski, 2 Eur Intell Prop Rev 58 (cited in note 58). Section 337 actions
encompass not only the importation or the sale after importation of products which infringe U.S. patents,
but also products which are manufactured abroad by a process that infringes a U.S. patent (19 USC §
1337(a)(B)(ii)). The phrase "owner, importer or consignee" includes any agent of the owner, importer or
consignce. 19 USC § 1337(a)(4).
An "industry" exists where there is substantial investment in the exploitation of a patent right,
including licensing. 19 USC § 1337(a)(3)(C).
71 For examples of the previous 1TC policy, see Certain Ultra-Microtone Freezing Attachments,
USITC Pub No 771 at 8-9; and Schaper Manufacturing Co v U.S. International Trade Commission, 717
F2d 1368, 219 USPQ 665 (Fed Cir 1983). See also Krosin and Kozlowski, 2 Eur Intell Prop Rev 58
(cited in note 58). Note that, in all cases, the complainant need no longer plead a prima facie case when
the alleged violator falls to submit a defense. Rogers, 8 Eur Intell Prop Rev 275 at 276 (cited in note 58).
Given the strict time requirements for filing applications, this change is significant, as Knight concludes.
Knight, 18 Ga J Intl & Comp L 47, 53 (cited in note 58).
72 19 USC § 1337(b)(1).
73 Id. The ITC must publish its reasons for designating an investigation as "complicated" in the
Federal Register.
74 19 USC § 1337(d). Note, however, that if during the investigation the ITC has reason to believe
that the parties involved have violated the statute, it may issue a temporary exclusion order under 19 USC
§ 1337(e). See also Krosin and Kozlowski, 2 Eur Intell Prop Rev 58 at 59 (cited in note 58).7 19 USC § 1337(f). The order prohibits the person(s) named from engaging in acts that violate
Section 337.
76 It is worth noting that a GATf Panel has concluded that Section 337 violates Article 111:4, the
national treatment provision, of the GATT and was not justified as necessary under Article XX(d). Re
United States Litigation Between E.. DuPont de Neinours & Co. and Akzo NJ.. I CMLR 715, 780-81
(1989) ("Akzo dispute"). See also Rogers, 8 Eur Intell Prop Rev 275 at 279-84 (cited in note 58), for a
description and analysis of the Panel decision. The United States has indicated that it will make its
acceptance of the ruling "dependent on a satisfactory result of the negotiations on intellectual property
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3. Section 301 of the Trade and TariffAct of 1974
a. The Mechanics of Section 301
Section 301 is the most important legislative tool available to the
United States in its campaign to shape the world's intellectual property laws.
This section of the Trade Act of 197477 figures in almost every discussion of
the U.S.-Thai patent dispute.78 Its influence is felt far beyond bilateral trade
talks; it has played a key role in the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks as
well. 79  The Section breaks into three interdependent components: the
industry-driven, "generic" 301, essentially the Section as it was in 1974, with
some amendments; 80 Super 301;81 and Special 301.82 The latter two
comprise new provisions added by the Trade Act of 1988.83
Generic Section 301 permits a person or company to petition the
USTR to investigate the trade practices of a foreign country, on the grounds
that the country (1) has unfairly denied market to a United States national, (2)
has violated an international agreement, or (3) inadequately protects U.S.
intellectual property.84  Hence, this provision is industry-driven, but the
USTR decides whether to investigate the alleged unfair trade practice.8 5 The
USTR also has the option to commence a Section 301 investigation on its
own initiative.8 6 The purpose of the investigation is to determine whether the
rights of United States nationals under a trade agreement are being denied or
rights of the [Uruguay] Round." Ingrid Nordgren, GATT Panels During the Uruguay Round: A Joker in
the Negotiating Game, 25:4 J World Trade 57, 68 (1991).
77 19 USC §§ 2411-2420 (cited in note 37). Provisions covering the National Trade Estimates are
codified at 19 USC §§ 2241-42.
78 See, for example, the articles and panel discussions in the report of the Georgia Law School
Conference, Overview of the Uruguay Round, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L, starting at 287 (1989).
79 Judith H. Bello and Alan F. Holmer, 'Special 301': Its Requirements, hnplementation and
Significance, 13 Fordham Intl L J 259, 268, 270 and 272 (1989-1990).
80 The most significant of the changes was the substitution of the United States Trade
Representative for the President in most provisions. Bello and Holmer, 13 Fordham Intl L J 259 at
264-65.
81 19 USC § 2420.
82 Special 301 is intertwined with the rest of Section 301. It adds substantially addition to the
factors to be considered in a Section 301 investigation, providing for unreasonable practices which include
"provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights." 19 USC §
2411g .. (3)(B)(i)(ll).
asBello and Holmer, 13 Fordham Intl L J 259 at 259 and 263 (cited in note 79).
84 19 USC § 2412(a)(2).
85 19 USC § 2412(a)(2). The decision must be made within 45 days of filing the petition.
86 19 USC § 2412(b)(1)(A). On the other hand, if the country has been named a priority country
under Super or Special 301, the USTR is obliged to begin the Section 301 process. 19 USC § 2240(b) and
19 USC § 2412(b)(2).
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if an act, policy or practice exists that is "unjustifiable," "discriminatory," or
"unreasonable" and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, 87 and, if so, to
determine what action to take. 88 The deadline for this determination is one
year from the start of the investigation. 89
Special 301 focuses on intellectual property and foreign market access
for U.S. intellectual property owners. Super 301 was a temporary measure
that required the USTR to "probe a wide variety of unfair trade practices over
a twelve-to eighteen-month period, in 1989 and 1990 only."90 Special 301,
on the other hand, is a permanent addition to Section 301. Aside from its
narrower focus, "Special 301" differs from the rest of Section 301 in the
timing of the process.
Under Special 301, within 30 days after the USTR has submitted the
annual National Trade Estimate Report to Congress, 91 the USTR must
identify countries that have inadequate intellectual property protection 92 or
that deny market access to U.S. intellectual property owners.93 The worst
offenders are to be named "priority foreign countries." 94 Within 30 days of
naming the priority offenders, the USTR must investigate the practices or
policies of these countries. 95 The USTR then has six months to complete the
87 19 usc §§ 2414(a)(1), 2411(a)(1)(B), and 2411(b)(1). These three terms are defined at 19 USC
§§ 241 1(d)(4), 241 l(d)(5) and 241 1(d)(3)(A), respectively. Examples of "unreasonable acts, policies or
practices" are found at 19 USC § 241 l(d)(3)(B).
88 19 USC § 2414(a)(2)(B). The USTR can choose from several possible actions. These include
withdrawing benefits granted to the identified country by a trade agreement, including the GSP (19 USC §
2411(c)(A)), imposing duties or import restrictions on any goods or economic sector of the offendihg
country (19 USC § 2411(c)(B)), and bilateral negotiations (19 USC § 241 1(c)(1)(C)).
89 19 Usc § 2414(a)(2)(B). A different deadline applies only in cases involving certain trade
agreements, in which case the determination must be made within 30 days from the conclusion of a
dispute settlement proceeding (19 USC § 2414(a)(2)(A)(i)), or where no such proceeding took place,
within eighteen months from the start of the Section 301 investigation (19 USC § 2414(a)(2)(A)(ii)).
90 Bello and Holmer, 13 Fordham Intl L J 259 at 263 (cited in note 79). The results of the Super
301 investigations, apparently, were meant to be used in the implementation of the other provisions of
Section 301. Any Super 301 recommendations would be enforced under the Special or generic 301 rules.
91 This Report was first used in 1985 in a general review of the GSP. Thailand was targeted, and
the result was the revocation of GSP benefits totaling up to $644 million. 19 USC § 2241(a)(1) requires
the USTR to analyze foreign acts harmful to U.S. trade and to estimate the impact of these acts on U.S.
commerce. 19 USC § 2241(b)(1) requires the Trade Representative, on or before March 31 of each year,
to submit "a report on the analysis and estimates made under subsection (a) of this section" to the
President and to certain Congressional Committees. The reports, called the National Trade Estimates,
must describe any 301 actions or negotiations with foreign governments by which the USTR intends to
redress the unfair foreign acts. 19 USC § 2241(b)(2).
92 19 USC § 2242(a)(l)(A).
93 19 USC § 2242(a)(1)(B). The words of the statute are "United States persons that rely on
intellectual property protection." This phrase is defined at 19 usc § 2242(b).
94 19 USC § 2242(a)(2). Rules for assigning this status are found at 19 USC § 2242(b).
95 19 USC § 2412(b)(2)(A).
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investigation and seek bilaterally negotiated solutions.96 The USTR must
monitor each named country to ensure that the remedial measures are
implemented. 97 If the country does not comply, the USTR has the discretion
to retaliate with a broad range of restrictions on imports.98 This discretion
formerly was the President's. 99 The USTR may also add new priority
countries at any time. 100
b. Section 301 Pressure on Thailand
The first time the USTR publicly threatened Thailand with a Section
301 investigation appears to have been on the day the Trade Representative,
then Clayton Yeutter, announced the cuts to Thailand's GSP benefits. 10 He
stated that "Thailand should be designated as a priority foreign country under
the 1988 Trade Act."102 When the time came to name priority countries,
however, Yeutter's successor, Carla Hills, did not include Thailand among
those named as Super 301 priority countries, and did not designate any
nations as Special 301 priority foreign countries.' 0 3 Instead, the USTR
placed twenty-five countries on a watch list.'04 Eight of these, including
Thailand, were named to a "priority watch list," and the rest, to a secondary
list.105 The eight countries were told in what areas they were to improve, I0 6
96 19 USC § 2414(a)(3)(A). If, however, the USTR decides that the issue is complex, or if the
named country appears to be mending its ways, the USTR has nine months to complete its investigation
and attempt a resolution.9 7 19 USC § 2416(a).
98 19 USC § 2416(b).
99 This transfer of authority did not appear in the Senate bill (S 490, § 305, 100th Cong, 1st Seas
(1987); S 1420, § 305, 100th Cong, 1st Sess (1987); see also S Rep No 71, 100th Cong, 1st Sess 79-80
(1987)); it was part of the proposal of the House of Representatives. During legislative negotiations, the
Senate receded on this issue. HR Conf Rep No 576, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 580-81, printed in 1988 US
Code Cong and Admin News 1547, 1613-14. The USTR's only constraint is that it is "subject to the
specific direction, if any, of the President." 19 USC § 2411(a)(1),(b)(2).
100 Bello and Holmer, 13 Fordham Inti L J 259 at 261-62 (cited in note 79).
101 GSP: President Reagan Denies Thailand Larger GSP Benefits, Citing Intellectual Property
Record, 6 Intl Trade Rep 96 (Jan 25, 1989). The cuts were announced on Jan 19, 1989. See note 53 and
accompanying text.102 Id.
103 Unfair Trade Practices: USTR Defends Administration's Naming of Japan, India, Brazil under
Super 301, 6 Inti Trade Rep 684 (May 31, 1989). The announcement was made on May 25, 1989, within
one month of the publication of the 1989 National Trade Estimate Report.
104 Id.105 ld.
106 See Pornpimol Kanchanalak and Ratchaphol Laovanitch, US keeps Thailand on 'priority watch
list', Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 3 (Nov 10, 1989). The demands were substantially the same as the ones
made before Thailand lost some of its GSP benefits.
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and were given 150 days to show some progress on their intellectual property
protection, during which time the USTR would informally investigate their
trade practices and monitor their progress. 107 Failure to make significant
progress could make them "targets for investigation and possible retaliation
under the Special 301 measure," the USTR warned.108
Prime Minister Chatichai expressed little concern over the threat of
U.S. trade retaliation, believing that Thai lobbying in Washington and "close
contacts with American politicians and business interests" had nullified the
problem.109 But at the end of the 150 day period, Thailand was one of the
five countries remaining on the priority watch list.110 Soon thereafter, the
Thai Commerce Ministry struck a committee to amend the Thai patent and
copyright law. 111 In April of 1990 the Trade Representative reevaluated
Thailand's position and again declined to designate Thailand or the other
countries on the watch list as priority foreign countries.
1 12
In the ensuing months considerable pressure was applied on Thailand,
particularly on the copyright issue. 113 On June 25, Trade Representative Hills
spelled out in a letter to the Thai Commerce Minister what Thailand had to do
to be removed from the Special 301 priority watch list. 114 She demanded the
introduction of patent law amendments in the .1991 parliamentary session,
which amendments were to eliminate the free importation provision in the
Thai Patent Act and limit the use of compulsory licensing to national
emergencies and violations of competition law." 5 The letter included other,
more flexible requests, and "urged the Thai Government to vigorously
107 6 Intl Trade Rep 684 (cited in note 103).
108 Id.
109 PMsays Section 301 no longer a big threat, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 3 (Aug 27, 1989).
10 Intellectual Property: Hills Removes Taiwan, Korea, Saudi Arabia From Priority List Five
Countries Remain, 6 Intl Trade Rep 1436 (Nov 8, 1989); Pornpimol Kanchanalak and Ratchaphol
Laovanitch, US keeps Thailand on 'priority watch list', Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 3 (Nov 10, 1989).
111 Panel seeks sweeping change in intellectual property rights laws, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 16
(Jan 5, 1990). The committee first met December 22-24, 1989. The members discussed copyright and
trademark law and concluded that there should be patents for pharmaceutical products, but they did not
discuss other contentious patent issues such as compulsory licensing and the duration of protection.
112 Intellectual Property: Hills, Citing Significant Progress, Declines To Name Countries Under
Special 301 Provision, 7 Intl Trade Rep 616 (May 2, 1990). This decision, announced on April 27, 1990,
was made despite strong pressure from the International Intellectual Property Alliance, a copyright group
that filed comments on the countries on the watch list before the Special 301 review deadline of February
23, 1990. Intellectual Property: Six Parties Comment on 17 Countries In Second Round Under Special
301 Provision, 7 Intl Trade Rep 300 (February 28, 1990).
113 Intellectual Property: Senators, Copyright Industries Criticize Thailand's Alleged Failure To
Stop Piracy, 7 Intl Trade Rep 854 (June 13, 1990).
114 US outlines Thailand's way offjpriority watch list, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 16 (July 13, 1990).
115 ldat cols 2 and 3.
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prosecute patent, copyright and trademark infringers." 116 On July 6, the Thai
Commerce Ministry announced the creation of the Patent and Trademark
Office, a "new and tougher body" to administer patents and trademarks. 117
But pressure on the copyright front continued, 118 and resulted in the USTR
agreeing to investigate Thailand's copyright practices under Section 301.119
Then, on January 30, 1991, the PMA filed a Section 301 petition against
Thailand. 120 The Trade Representative accepted it on March 15.121 With the
publication of the 1991 National Trade Estimate came the announcement on
April 26 that Thailand, along with China and India, were designated as
priority foreign countries under Special 301.122
While these events were occurring, Thailand was busy preparing to
revise its intellectual property law. In January of 1991, the government
announced plans for an International Trade Policy Committee and an
administrative panel of senior Cabinet ministers. 123 Thailand had prepared
draft amendments for its trademark law and its patent law, and the Commerce
116 Idat cols 4-5.
117 Get-tough body beingformed to monitor patents, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev (July 20, 1990).
118 Intellectual Property: U.S. Copyright Coalition Announces Intention To File Section 301
Complaint Against Thailand, 7 Intl Trade Rep 1645 (Oct 31, 1990).
119 Intellectual Property: U.S. Copyright Industry Coalition Files Unfair Trade Complaint Against
Thailand, 7 Intl Trade Rep 1768 (Nov 21, 1990); Intellectual Property: U.S. Launches Investigation of
Thailand's Weak Enforcement of Copyright Legislation, 8 Intl Trade Rep 4 (Jan 2, 1991); USTR initiates
Section 301 Investigation, IP Asia 38 (Jan 10, 1991). The industry petition was accepted on December
21, 1990, giving the USTR until December 21, 1991 to conclude the investigation and announce its
decision.
120 US pharmaceutical move upsets Thai Govt, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 13 (February 2, 1991);
Intellectual Property: Pharmaceutical Industry Files Petition Against Thailand Over Patent Protection,
8 Intl Trade Rep 200 (February 6, 1991); Section 301 complaint filed over drug patent protection, IP Asia
24 (Mar 21, 1991).
121 Intellectual Property: USTR Initiates Section 301 Investigation of Thailand's Pharmaceutical
Patent Law, 8 Intl Trade Rep 433 (Mar 20, 1991); Patent protection for pharmaceuticals-USTR accepts
PMA4'spetition, IP Asia 22 (Apr 25, 1991). The deadline for this investigation was March 15, 1992.
122 Intellectual Property: USTR Designates China, India, and Thailand Most Egregious Violators
Under Special 301, 81 Intl Trade Rep 643 (May 1, 1991); USTR names India, Thailand and PRC as
priority foreign countries, IP Asia 10 (May 30, 1991); Intellectual Property: China Calls Designation
Under Special 301 'Unacceptable', Warns Trade Ties Endangered, 8 Intl Trade Rep 644 (May 1, 1991).
The latter two reports indicate the force of China's objection to the designation. It may help explain why
China was later treated more leniently by the United States than was Thailand. The Thai Prime Minister's
Office Minister recently expressed resentment toward the United States over its more lenient dealings with
China and India. See Pornpimol Kanchanalak, US to press new govt to atend patent law, Bangkok Post
Weekly Rev 4 col 2 (Mar 27, 1992).
123 Ratchaphol Laovanitch, Govt plans new panel to handle overseas trade, Bangkok Post Weekly
Rev 15 (February 10, 1991). The purpose of these new bodies was to better evaluate international trade
issues and present a unified, coherent front "in adopting both 'offensive' and 'defensive' roles when dealing
with bilateral or multilateral issues." This goal indicates both a willingness to respond to the U.S.
demands and a growing sense that the United States was bullying Thailand.
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Ministry was ready to submit them to the National Legislative Assembly. 124
After a two-day meeting with the USTR in Los Angeles, the Thai delegation
believed that the amendments would "comply with international standards and
best serve the country's interests," as well as alleviate pressure from the
United States.125 It would seem that the Thai officials did not anticipate the
designation as a priority foreign country.126 Commerce Minister Amaret
Silaon pledged to review Thailand's export policy "to avoid any adverse
effects from possible sanctions." 127
The question of intellectual property amendments became, once again,
a hot political issue in Thailand. 128  The debate intensified after the
legislature's passage of the draft amendments on first reading.129 On the one
124 US seeks tougher stand on property protection, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 11 (Mar 29, 1991).
125 Id. A "highly-placed source" in the Thai Ministry of Commerce said that he was not surprised
that the USTR accepted the PMA position, but "he expected that USTR would put Thailand on the
'priority watch list' for another year after it expired on April 30, and then observe Thailand's progress on
the issue for about six months." Id. Even the acceptance of the petition was a disappointment to some:
"[tlhe USTR's decision has dashed the hopes of some Thai officials who feel that Thailand has made
enough progress toward adequate and effective pharmaceutical patent protection. Permanent Secretary of
Commerce Bajr Israsena said he had hoped the US government would decide not to take action because
the Patent Act was currently undergoing reform and details of the proposed revisions had been submitted
at the Los Angeles talks."
126 Their surprise was likely the greater given that a military junta had taken control of the Thai
government in February. See Popular putsch, Far Eastern Economic Review 17 (Mar 7, 1991); The Day
of the Generals, Asiaweek 43 (Mar 8, 1991); and Seventeenth time unlucky, The Economist 33 (Mar 2,
1991). A coup is nothing new to Thailand. See J.J. Wright, The Balancing Act: A History of Modern
Thailand 262-318 (1991). But the coup did interfere with the legislative process, making quick
compliance with the USTR's demands difficult. For example, draft amendments had to be resubmitted to
the National Legislative Assembly. See Patent protection for pharnaceuticals-USTR accepts PMA's
petition, IP Asia 22 (Apr 25, 1991). See also Ex-MPs call on US to delay 301 sanctions, Bangkok Post
Weekly Rev 5 (May 10, 1991).
127 US trade action prompts review of export policy, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 11 (May 10, 1991).
This statement again reflects a willingness to comply with the U.S. demands mixed with a growing desire
to become less dependent on the United States. Consider in this regard the following statement: "[Mr.
Amaret] said it [is] necessary in the long run to promote or expand Thai exports to other potential
markets, particularly the Middle East and Eastern Europe."
128 See, for example, Ex-MPs call on US to delay 301 sanctions, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 5 (May
10, 1991). The article includes a picture of a student protest against capitulation to American interests.
The students held up placards that depicted Commerce Minister Amaret as a traitor who is in the back
pocket of the U.S. drug industry. See also United stance needed against US-minister [Amaret], Bangkok
Post Weekly Rev 13 (May 24, 1991); Ratchaphol Laovanitch, Tape producers protest crackdown,
Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 13 col 4 (May 24, 1991); Minister predicts trouble ahead in patent issue talks,
Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 14 (July 26, 199 1); Academics praise new amended patent draft, Bangkok Post
Weekly Rev 11 (Aug 2, 1991); and Cabinet likely to decide on key drug patent issue, Bangkok Post
Weekly Rev 13 (Sept 27, 1991). This was the second time that U.S. pressure had caused public upheaval
in Thailand (the furor over copyright amendments four years previous had led to the toppling of the Thai
government). See text accompanying note 49.
129 The first reading allows the legislature to vote on the bill in principle, without debating its
details. The bill then goes to a committee for examination. After winning cabinet approval on October 22
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hand, the USTR and the PMA pressured the Thai government to provide
protection for drugs already invented but not yet marketed in Thailand
("pipeline" drugs), to limit compulsory licensing and to make the amendments
effective immediately on passage in the legislature. 130 On the other, students,
academics, lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, some drug producers, and
non-governmental organizations opposed "pipeline" protection and limits on
the compulsory licensing scheme, insisting that full drug patents would make
health care too expensive for the poor' 3' and that U.S. firms would
monopolize the production of new drugs in Thailand. 132 The Public Health
Ministry joined the debate by arguing for a transition period of at least four
years before the amendments would take effect, instead of the 180-day
period being considered by the Intellectual Property Committee. 133 Those
campaigning against drug patents called for a public hearing and issued their
own "white paper" criticizing the proposed amendments, 134 but the Chair of
the Intellectual Property Committee refused to grant one, promising to
"consider the impact of the bill on all parties."' 35 The government was
clearly committed to passing the bill as soon as possible, in order to satisfy
the United States while also acting in Thailand's best interests.
136
At this stage it became apparent that, despite early signs of U.S.
satisfaction with the Thai government's efforts, 137 the USTR and PMA would
not approve of the amendments. 138 Nonetheless, the Thai government
(PM to decide on pharmaceutical grace period, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 12 (Nov 8, 1991)), the patent
amendments were introduced into the National Legislative Assembly. They were approved on November
8, 1991. Intellectual Property: Thailand Attempts To Approve Patent Bill To Head Off Future US.
Trade Sanctions, 9 Intl Trade Rep 64 (Jan 8, 1992).
130 US: settlement key issue, not delegates, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 3 (June 28, 1991); Pornpimol
Kanchanalak, Thai-US meeting fails to resolve copyright issue, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 2 (July 5,
1991); Minister predicts troubles ahead in patent issue talks, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 14 (July 26,
1991); USTR: Piracy talks will make headway, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 4 (Oct 4, 1991); USTR seeks
reprisal comment on Thailand, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev (Nov 29, 1991).
131 Academics praise new amended patent draft, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 11 (Aug 2, 1991). See
also Drug producers [foreign companies in Thailand] express support for Patents Bill, Bangkok Post
Weekly Rev 5 (Nov 22, 1991) (some doctors cite surveys of rural hospitals that indicate that the prices of
medicine would rise 400 percent if the amendments were passed).
132 See Academics praise new amended patent draft, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 11 (Aug 2, 1991).
133 PM to decide on pharmaceutical grace period, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 12 (Nov 8, 1991);
Patent Bill: Why new amendments are needed, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 8 (Jan 3, 1992).
134 Drug producers express support for Patents Bill, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 5 (Nov 22, 1991);
Anti-Patents drive hots up with issue of'white paper, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 13 (Nov 29, 1991).
135 Groups want public hearing on patents, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 12 (Dec 20, 1991).
13 6 Minister putsjob on line over US trade reprisals, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 11 (Nov 29, 1991);
Oranuch Anusaksathien, Drug industry unwavered in attack on bill, The Nation (Jan 17, 1992).
137 See notes 123-26.
13 8 Minister puts job on line over US trade reprisals, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 11 (Nov 29, 1991).
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proceeded with the legislative process,139 while the USTR prepared to make
its decision on the Section 301 investigation into Thailand's patent protection,
and on Thailand's Special 301 Status. 140
On February 27, 1992, the Thai legislature passed the amendments to
the Patent Act. 141  The changes accommodated many of Washington's
demands, principal among them the protection of pharmaceuticals and the
extension of patent life to twenty years. 142 The changes did not include
protection of "pipeline" drugs, however. 143 They did include compulsory
license provisions to prevent monopolistic abuse of patents, and they created
a Pharmaceutical Patent Board to help prevent excessive prices for drugs.
144
On March 13, 1992, Trade Representative Hills announced the results of the
Section 301 investigation into Thai patent protection.145 The USTR found
against Thailand, but decided to delay any punitive action or negotiations
139 Commerce Minister Amaret, while acknowledging that the USTR was disappointed with the
patents bill, "was still confident Washington would not retaliate against Thailand on the matter."
Minister puts job on line over US trade reprisals, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 11 (Nov 29, 1991). His
confidence must have been boosted somewhat when the Trade Representative decided the Section 301
copyright investigation in Thailand's favor. USTR halts probe into copyright violations, Bangkok Post
Weekly Rev I (Dec 27, 1991); Intellectual Properly: USTR's 301 Copyright Investigation Against
Thailand Over, Hills Says, 9 Intl Trade Rep 15 (Jan 1, 1992). The focus of the Minister's efforts was on
satisfying the U.S. government, and by the end of 1991 the Commerce Ministry was giving little
consideration to criticisms and suggestions from groups opposed to the bill. Despite this indifference,
opponents of the proposed amendments continued their efforts into 1992, while the Thai Pharmaceutical
Manufacturer's Association criticized the terms of licensing proposed by patent holders. They also
criticized the proposed Price Review Board and compulsory licensing scheme, recommending that the
"period of protection be tied to the patent holders' agreeing to transfer technology" and proposing a
four-year grace period. Oranuch Anusaksathien, Drug indushy unwavered in attack on bill, The Nation
(Jan 17, 1992); and Oranuch Anusaksathien, Experts want patent phase-in extended, The Nation
(February 20, 1992).
14 The Section 301 investigation had to be concluded by March 15, 1992. US pharmaceutical
move upsets Thai Govt, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 13 (February 2, 1991); Section 301 complaintfiled
over drug patent protection, IP Asia 24 (Mar 21, 1991). The USTR set a deadline for comments on Thai
patent protection of March 10. Comments On Patent Protection In Thailand, 9 Intl Trade Rep 373
(February 26, 1992). There was at this stage increased pressure from Congress on the USTR to take
action against Thailand. Japan: Baucus Calls S11 TalksA Failure, Presses USTR To Set Number Targets,
9 Intl Trade Rep 92 (Mar 18, 1992). Some members of Congress had not been satisfied in previous years
with the mere naming of foreign countries to lists; they wanted retaliation. For example, in May 1989,
Representative Gephardt stated: "[Bush] has cared more about offending the delicate sensibilities of our
foreign allies than about protecting American jobs." Unfair Trade Practices: USTR Defends
Administration's Naming OfJapan, India, Brazil Under Super 301, 6 Intl Trade Rep 684 (May 31, 1989).
141 Porpimol Kanchanalak, US to press new govt to anend patent law, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev
4 col 2(_r 27, 1992).
143 Id. See also The Remaining Differences, Bangkok Post (Mar 18, 1992).
144 Id. See also Intellectual Property: USTR Finds Against Thailand On Patents, Delays Action
UntilAer Thai Election, 9 Inti Trade Rep 478 (Mar 18, 1992).
145 Id.
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until after the Thai general election scheduled for mid-March. 146 Among the
reasons for the negative judgment were "deficiencies" in the amended Patent
Act, which PMA President Mossinghoff declared were "completely
unacceptable."' 47 The deficiencies were principally the lack of protection for
"pipeline" drugs, the "onerous" compulsory licensing provisions and the
"appalling" Pharmaceutical Patent Board, 148 which is empowered by section
55 of the Act to demand pricing and cost information from drug patent
applicants. 149
In the 1992 National Trade Estimate Report, the USTR said that the
above "deficiencies" "effectively negate the other provisions in the
amendment."150  Following the release of the Report, the Trade
Representative announced on April 29, 1992 that Thailand would remain a
priority foreign country. 151 In the announcement, the "pipeline" drug issue
was emphasized, and Trade Representative Hills said that revoking Thailand's
GSP benefits would be an option. 152 The then-new Commerce Minister,
Anuwat Wattanapongsiri, and his officials expressed frustration with the U.S.
actions, and complained that Thailand's amended patent law "conforms with
proposed new international rules that have virtually been agreed upon in
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade."'153 The announcement on October
146 Id. This decision came as a blow to Thai exporters and officials, who had hoped the amended act
would eliminate the threat of sanctions.147 Id.
14 81d. The United States had won on one issue in contention. The four-year grace period
advocated by the Thai Health Ministry was not adopted. Instead, a transition period of 180 days was
chosen. See PM to decide on phannaceutical grace period, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 12 (Nov 8, 1991);
Patent Bill: Why new anendments are needed, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 8 (Jan 3, 1992); see note 133
and accompanying text.
149 This board is, apparently, similar to Canada's Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, created
at the end of 1987, in response to U.S. pressure on Canada to provide drug patents. The Canadian Board
also may demand annual pricing and cost information from patent applicants and holders. See note 25.
150 1992 NTE at 242 (cited in note 53).
151 Pornpimol Kanchanalak, New complaints keep Thais on list for US trade action, Bangkok Post
Weekly Rev 11 (May 8, 1992); Intellectual Property: USTR Cites India, Taiwan, Thailand as Worst
Intellectual Property Offenders, 9 Intl Trade Rep 784 (May 6, 1992).152 Id.
153 Id. Not only does the GATT proposal exclude protection for "pipeline" drugs, but it includes a
ten year grace period to allow developing countries to prepare for drug patenting. Of course, the PMA has
objected to the GAIT text. GAT: GATT Intellectual Property Text Called "Unacceptable" To
Pharmaceutical Finns, 9 Intl Trade Rep 642 (Apr 8, 1992). Some members of Congress are sympathetic
with the view of the PMA. See Trade Policy: Baucus Urges Comprehensive Trade Bill, Saying Passage
Is Possible This Year, 9 Intl Trade Rep 673 (Apr 15, 1992). For an analysis of the draft GATr text on
intellectual property in relation to Thailand's patent law amendments, see Peter Mytri Ungphakorn and
Ratchapol Laovanitch, Where Thailand really stands on protection for pharmaceuticals, Bangkok Post
(Feb 21, 1992).
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10, 1992 that Thailand will remain on the priority foreign country list 154
indicates that the United States is not retreating from its position.
155
4. GA TT and WIPO
In addition to its negotiations directly with Thailand, the United States
has worked to obtain a multilateral agreement setting out minimum standards
of intellectual property protection. Its efforts in this regard have been within
the Uruguay Round of the GATT multilateral trade negotiations and, to a
lesser degree, the World Intellectual Property Organization. Rather than
pursuing numerous bilateral negotiations and agreements, The United States
hoped the Uruguay Round would yield a comprehensive treaty providing the
intellectual property rights that the U.S. private sector desires. 156 Moreover,
Congress has shown that it feels justified in using Section 301 and Section
337 threats within the GATT negotiations. Thus, even in its multilateral
154 Thittinan Pongsudhirak, Redress sought in tightening of drug patent law, The Nation (Nov 2,
1992)i55 Indeed, the climate in the U.S. Senate may be even more amenable to protectionism and
"aggressive unilateralism." Another aggressive trade bill is on its way through that body. See Trade
Policy, 9 Intl Trade Rep 673 (Apr 15, 1992); and Susumu Awanohara, Super 301: the sequel, Far Eastern
Economic Review 49, 50 (May 28, 1992) (Trade Representative Hills was quoted as saying that "the effect
[of the proposed trade bill] is very likely to be a trade contraction."). Early signals from the Clinton
administration hint that an aggressive trade stance may be promoted by the President. See Dan
Goodgame, No Sleeping Dog, Time 18 (Jan 18, 1993).
The Clinton administration is likely to restrict domestic drug prices even more than previous
governments. See notes 25 and 27, and Murray Campbell, Clinton takes a shot at drug industry: Vaccine
manufacturers accused ofprofiteering by President, The [Toronto] Globe & Mail Al (February 13, 1993).
As a likely result, the PMA will step up pressure on the government to obtain unrestricted patents in
Thailand and elsewhere. In light of the potential for price controls in the United States, the PMA may
pursue its goal of eliminating any price controls in Thailand with greater vigor. See Pornpimol
Kanchanalak, US to press new govt to amend patent law, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 4 col 2 (Mar 27,
1992). Thailand is already quite concerned about President Clinton's potentially aggressive stance on
international trade. Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, Dean of the Law Faculty of Chulalongkorn University in
Bangkok, has expressed his concerns over "Mr. Clinton's stated intention to strengthen the United States'
international trade policy in order to bolster its competitive edge." See Surakiart sees Clinton win hurting
Thai exports to US, Bangkok Post 1 (Nov 2, 1992).
156 As one commentator observed, failure to reach a consensus on a comprehensive intellectual
property agreement will result in a proliferation of bilateral and unilateral actions. Bilzi, 19 Ga J Intl &
Comp L 343 at 350 (cited in note 22). Moreover, with the unified participation in Uruguay of private
sector pressure groups such as the IPC (Intellectual Property Committee, a collection of U.S. firms with a
stake in intellectual property protection, on which PMA members are well represented), the UNICE
(Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe) and the Keidanren (the Japanese
Federation of Economic Organizations), it is hard to believe that the developing countries will be able to
band together and prevent the unilateralization of the GATT process. For a description of the efforts of
these groups, see Bilzi, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 343 (cited in note 22).
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negotiations with the developing countries, the United States has arrogated to
itself the power unilaterally to define unfair trade practices, the time period
for their elimination and suitable retaliation against continued offenders.' 57 In
fact, Congress is not only quite willing to use these provisions, they are not
considered tough enough.158
The approach adopted by the United States, however, raises the
question whether GATT is the appropriate forum in which to implement a set
of minimum standards, dispute settlement procedures and enforcement
mechanisms for intellectual property. 159 A full discussion of this issue is
beyond the scope of this paper. It should be noted, however, that a GATT
minimum standards agreement would have significant consequences for
Thailand. Thailand is likely to sign a version of GATT that includes a
minimum standards agreement on patents rather than forfeit the potential
economic gains it offers. 160 Thus, while Thailand ostensibly has more
bargaining power in the GATT than it would have alone, 161 it is in fact almost
as vulnerable there as it is in its bilateral talks with the United States.
With the United States concentrating its efforts on bilateral talks with
Thailand and other developing countries and the multilateral forum of GATT,
the World Intellectual Property Organization has been given short shrift over
the past decade. 162 This neglect seems to indicate that the United States has
157 See Claude E. Barfield, Services, Intellectual Property and the Major Issues of the Uruguay
Round, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 307, 311 (1989).
158 U.S. Rep Jenkins, Panel Discussion: Overview of the Uruguay Round, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L
326, 329 (1989).
159 A significant body of literature has developed regarding the GATT and intellectual property.
See, for example, P.M. Kelly and J.M. Melton, Select Bibliography: The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 25 Tex Intl L J 317, 325 (1991).
160 Many countries, developed and developing, expect to gain a great deal from an Uruguay Round
agreement. See Free trade's fading champion, The Economist 65 (Apr 11, 1992). As that article points
out at 66, stronger countries, particularly the United States, rely less on the GATT to improve trade
relationships. Instead they are able to use their clout to chart "an increasing unilateral course in trade
policy." They have less to lose if the Uruguay Round fails. It is for the developing countries that rely on
international trade to maintain their economic growth that a GATT agreement is almost imperative.
161 See Bilzi, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 343 at 347 (cited in note 22) ("Increased bilateralism is
harmful to weaker countries, which rely on the multilateral system to discipline those that are more
powerful."). This statement seems to presume that the developing countries are a strong, unified
bargaining block. Even if that were true, these countries are still in the weaker position-they need to be a
member nation if they hope to develop further via world trade, so they are unlikely to refuse to sign a
GATT agreement, even if there are requirements, such as patents for drugs, that are contrary to their
domestic policies. While this dilemma does not smack of coercion in the way that the United States'
bilateral negotiations with Thailand do, the end result is the same. For its economic well being, Thailand
has no choice but to sign an agreement over the content of which it has had little influence.
16 2 See Michael K. Kirk, WIPO's Involvement in International Developments, 50 Albany L Rev 601
(1986).
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rejected the idea of revising the treaties that WIPO oversees and redesigning
the structure of the organization. Some writers have questioned the United
States' preference for the GATT over WIPO, suggesting that intellectual
property protection, while trade-related, is a more appropriate subject for
WIPO negotiations than GATT talks. 163
WIPO is well suited to deal fully with intellectual property issues and
their relation to trade. For a country like Thailand, which may not yet be
ready to protect drug patents without any protection against monopoly abuse
or high prices, WIPO's potential for greater flexibility is attractive.
164 In
contradistinction, the U.S. position in GATT talks has not been flexible.
165
The United States has sought a single set of standards, effective immediately,
at its own level of protection. It is improbable that such an agreement would
be ratified within WIPO, because developing countries would gain nothing by
it. GATT provides the United States with the leverage-trade benefits--to
induce Thailand to acquiesce to U.S. demands for intellectual property
protection. Perhaps this is why the United States has turned away from
WIPO.
1I. EVALUATION OF THE U.S. POSMON
This section focuses on the unilateral stance of the United States in
pressing Thailand to revise its pharmaceutical patent law. It first considers
whether Thailand is economically, structurally and socio-culturally ready for
patent protection for drugs and the step to industrialized status that such
protection symbolizes. Then, in light of these economic, structural and
cultural considerations, the U.S. position is analyzed from a "principle of
trade" perspective, including a discussion of what would best serve U.S.
interests. Finally, the section addresses the question whether the U.S. tactics
163 David Hartridge and Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights: The Issues in GAT, 22
Vand J Transnatl L 893, 904 (1989).
164 For example, a graduated treaty with levels of protection corresponding to the stage of economic
development reached could be designed to accommodate the disparate levels of economic development
among developing countries. Intellectual property experts within WIFO could sit on a tribunal with the
power to adjudicate disputes and enforce the treaties. Some such scheme would fit well within the
existing administration of WIPO. Rather than extending the GATT Secretariat's authority to an area in
which it lacks expertise, why not use the existing body?
165 The U.S. response to the GATT text on intellectual property has been disapproval, particularly
of the ten year transition period before compliance is required. See GA77. GA7T Intellectual Property
Text Called "Unacceptable" to Pharmaceutical Firns, 9 Intl Trade Rep 642 (Apr 8, 1992); for evidence
of Congress' sympathy with the pharmaceutical industry's position, see Trade Policy: Baucus Urges
Comprehensive Trade Bill, Saying Passage Is Possible This Year, 9 Intl Trade Rep 673 (Apr 15, 1992).
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have a basis in a moral concept of property or in the goal of international
trade liberalization.
A. Patent Protection of Drugs and Thailand's Economy
Thailand is often referred to as the "fifth tiger"-the next country to join
the ranks of the newly industrialized countries in East Asia (Hong Kong,
Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore). One author takes the view that
Thailand has reached the level of economic "development of Korea and
Taiwan fifteen years ago." 166 These four countries have outgrown their
"developing country" status and have emerged as developed economic tigers,
as the metaphor goes. Thailand, however, has not yet reached that stage-it is
still in its tiger infancy.
The United States has concluded that Thailand is ready to enact laws
and regulatory programs similar to those of the United States.167 Because
Thailand has a fast-developing industrial sector, the country's intellectual
property laws are considered an aberration among the industrialized
countries. This perception is inaccurate. It assumes that there are only two
possible economic states: the impoverished, agrarian Third World country,
and the polished, innovative industrial powerhouse. Thailand, however, is in
the process of shifting from a rural (rice-producing) economy to an urban,
industrial economy. It is still well below the economic level of Japan, Hong
Kong or even Taiwan or Korea. Why should its patent laws be the same as
theirs?16 8
166 O'Neill, 11 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 603 (cited in note 11).
167 See, for example, Into Bo Champon, The Next "Little Tiger"." Manufacturing and Intellectual
Property Rights in Thailand, 3 Transnatl Lawyer 275, 318 ("Thailand is no longer a Third World
country.").
168 Only recently have several of the world's developed countries adopted patent laws similar to
those that the United States demands of Thailand. The Federal Republic of Germany, Spain and Japan
have only in the past twenty-five years adopted patent protection for drugs, and some of these countries
still allow parallel importing of patented products. See Rajan Dhanjee and Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes, Trade RelatedAspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs): Objectives, Approaches and
Basic Principles of the GA 7T and of Intellectual Property Rights in Thailand, 24:5 J World Trade 5, 8
(1990); see also Preeya Seebunrueang, Drug patents: who benefits? Manager 5 (Sept 24, 1990). Preeya
Seebunrueang points out that South Korea developed well "in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals and
fine chemicals, before being forced to adopt complete product patent protection of pharmaceuticals in July
1987." The U.S.-style patent, then, has not been universally accepted as good even for developed
economies. The system has come under fire recently on several fronts. An article in The Economist
suggests that, in the United States, "attempts to encourage innovation through the stricter application of
patent and copyright laws are now threatening to crush it," and concludes that, while "international
cooperation on intellectual property is needed... America would do better to lower the expectations of
innovators, instead of trying to export its own over-ambitious principles." The harm of patents, The
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Some commentators endeavor to analyze the development of third
world countries more carefully. They propose that a country, such as
Thailand, that is still shifting from a rural to an urban economy, can benefit
from patent protection because a transfer of technology and know-how will
only come about when a country provides adequate patent protection. In their
view, large companies such as Pfizer and Merck will license their patents to
Thai firms and show these firms how to use the technology and how to
develop their own new drugs. As a result, Thai companies will expand and
will adopt new technology. They will invent new drugs, thus maximizing
their own (private) benefits and simultaneously maximizing social welfare by
supplying consumers with better drugs and driving down the prices of the
older drugs, even those still under patent. 16
9
Several problems arise in connection with this viewpoint. 170 To begin
with, many of these big finns have already entered the Thai market.171 Those
Economist 15 (Aug 22, 1992).
169 See Richard T. Rapp and Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property
Protection in Developing Countries, 24:5 J World Trade 75, 77-80 (1990).
170 The following analysis focuses on Thailand and drug patents. It does not deal with the general
question whether patents are an effective economic policy for any country, be it developing, nearly
industrialized or fully industrialized. It is still uncertain in the United States whether the negative effects
of patents outweigh the benefits they are supposed to provide. See William G. Shepherd, The Economics
of Industrial Organization, (Prentice Hall, 3d ed 1990). The central concern revolves around the
difference between autonomous inventions and induced inventions. Autonomous inventions "arise
naturally from the flow of knowledge and technology," and from "the sheer curiosity of creative geniuses."
Id. at 143. Induced inventions arise from the incentive to make money; money comes as a result of the
exclusivity of use or sale that a patent provides. Society gains if patent law induces a beneficial invention,
such as a new drug, but the cost of high prices and potential exploitation during the patent term may
outweigh the benefit. Some inventions may occur sooner than without patents, but perhaps only a few
months or years sooner. Id. Moreover, the monetary incentive may cause excessive research and
development spending, because of duplication in research. Id. at 162. The patent incentive is indefinite
as opposed to a finite, efficient reward. As Shepherd suggests, "supra-competitive profits tend to induce
lesser amounts of later innovation because the creative activity is voluntary rather than compelled by strict
competition." Id. at 162. Thus, the case for drug patents in Thailand is not as clear-cut as some
commentators imply. The recent trend in the United States toward controlling the price of drugs may
indicate that the costs of drug patent protection have begun to exceed the costs.
In addition to concerns about the efficacy of patent protection in the United States, there are
numerous concerns specific to developing countries that supporters of the PMA have not acknowledged.
See Douglas F. Greer, The Case Against Patent Systems in Less-Developed Countries, 8 J Intl L & Econ
223 (1973), and Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or
Myth? 1987 Duke L J 831.
171 Most of the large U.S. firms have representative offices or distribution centers in Thailand;
Bristol-Myers-Squibb, Eli Lilly, Glaxo, Pfizer, Upjohn and Wellcome are a few of the multinational
companies with offices in Thailand. The following companies operate through local companies: DuPont,
Eli Lilly, Merck, Sharpe & Dohme, Roche, SmithKline Beecham. See the Manufacturers' Index of the
TIMS Annual 1991 (MIMS, 1991). Foreign-controlled companies that manufacture drugs in Thailand
include Bayer Laboratories Ltd. (100% German), International Capsule Co. (100% Dutch), Olic
(Thailand) Ltd. (89% Swiss), Organon (Thailand) Ltd. (100% Dutch), SmithKline & French (Thailand)
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companies are not likely to license their drug patents to local firms. While
they might expand their operations in Thailand, their tactics so far indicate
that they are likely to squeeze many of the Thai firms out of the market. 172
Of particular concern is the possibility that the U.S. firms will use patent law
and trademark law to monopolize the sale in Thailand of all new
U.S.-manufactured drugs. By setting up authorized distributors in the
country and registering trademarks and patents for all new drugs, the U.S.
pharmaceutical manufacturers might be able to prevent Thai "parallel
importers" from competing in the sale of U.S.-manufactured drugs. Thus not
only would U.S. firms monopolize the manufacture of new drugs, they might
be able to monopolize all new drug sales, without even setting up
manufacturing and research and development facilities-with the resulting
economic linkages-in Thailand.173 This point finds support in several studies
that indicate that, at present, drug patenting is likely to be detrimental to
Thailand.174
Ltd. (100% U.S.), Thai Kawasumi Co. (91.33% Japanese), and Thai Sankyo Co. (49% Japanese).
Thailand Company Information 1992-93 (Advanced Research Group, 1992).
172 There are precedents for this situation. Gabriel Wilner talked about a fairly industrialized
Western African country that he and some others had studied:
We looked at the number of patents that had been registered in the country over a period
of years, and in particular, at patents that concerned manufacturing sectors. In one of
the years studied, a number of patents had been registered; all but one had been
registered by foreign companies. Yet, no manufacturing had been commenced using
any of the inventions or processes that had been registered.
. . . Apparently, foreign companies register their patents to exclude imports and to
protect their eventual entry into the regional market at some future time. Obviously
what the country needed was the capacity to innovate on its own. However, its
immediate preoccupation was with whether it could sell its raw materials at prices that
would keep its economy going.
Panel Two: General Discussion 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 366, 380-81 (1989).
173 For a discussion of parallel importing in the context of vertical integration and monopoly, see
the U.S. case, Bell & Howell. Mamiya Co. v Masel Supply Co., 548 F Supp 1063 (1982). The key is
whether the trademark law of the country is universal or territorial in scope. If the latter, the distributor,
even if a wholly-owned subsidiary of the foreign firm, is treated as a separate trademark owner (where it
has been assigned the registered mark) and can prevent an importer from selling goods manufactured by
the (foreign) parent company. An example of such a result is the Canadian case Remington Rand Ltd. v
TransworldMetal Co., (1960) 32 Can Patent Rptr 99 (Ex Ct). The international pharmaceutical industry
is particularly ripe for the latter scenario, since local distributors of drugs often reformulate or repackage
the products to give them a more local appearance. OECD, The Pharmaceutical Industry at 13 (cited in
note 23). This repackaging identifies the drugs with the local company rather than its international
parent, thus facilitating the territorial trademark view. This local distinctiveness was crucial in the
RemingIon Rand ase.174 Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, 29 Mal L Rev 329 at 333 (cited in note 13). Dr. Surakiart cites, as an
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Even when a patent holder does license the manufacture of the drug to
a Thai firm, the terms of licensing can be used to control local production and
hamper competition. Even in the United States, abuse of patent protection
occurs frequently. Indeed, U.S. anti-trust law has been essential in curbing
the use of patents to suppress competition.' 75 It has been suggested that in
Thailand, the original patent holder "would effectively prevent development
of patents for raw materials, since such products must be sought from the
licensors only." 176 This danger is significant enough to prompt the Thai
government to consider linking its competition legislation with the newly
amended Patent Act to help prevent licensing abuses by drug patent holders
and, thereby, boost the bargaining power of Thai manufacturers in license
negotiations. 177
Another flaw in the arguments advanced by the foregoing
commentators stems from the ease with which drugs can be copied and
manufactured.178 There is little need for the transfer of drug manufacturing
know-how, since the U.S. patent divulges to the world the components of a
drug. Since Thai firms can use the innovative ideas of the United States
without having to pay expensive license fees, there would be little increased
example, Dr. Vaivudhi Thanesvorakul's paper, TPMA Position on Intellectual Property Rights, which was
presented at a seminar at Siam Intercontinental Hotel, Bangkok on Jan 23, 1987. General studies of
patent law and developing countries also support the view that the adoption of a full patent system may
not be appropriate for many countries. For example, it has been observed that small nations that do not
generate much domestic inventive activity do not gain from patent protection. M.K. Berkowitz and Y.
Kotowitz, Patent Policy in an Open Economy 15 Can J Econ 1, 8-12 (1982). Another article proposes
that, while the developed countries always gains from increased patent protection, developing countries
are better off with weak or no patent protection. J.C. Chin and G.M. Grossman, Intellectual Properly
Rights and North-South Trade, in RW. Jones and A.O. Kruger, eds, The Political Economy of
International Trade 91 (Basil Blackwell, 1990). This article finds support in Arvind Subramanian, The
International Economics of Intellectual Property Rights Protection: A Welfare Theoretic Analysis, 19
World Development 945, 951-54 (1991).
175 See W. Sichel, Patents and Technical Change in J.W. Markham and W. Sichel, eds, Industrial
Organization and Public Policy: Selected Readings 239, 240-41 (Houghton Mifflin, 1967).
176 Oranuch Anusaksathien, Drug industry unwavered in attack on bill, The Nation (Jan 17, 1992).
The article cites the Japanese control of car manufacturing in Thailand as an example of this use of
licensing agreements to exercise control over Thai companies that makes them, in effect, subsidiaries of
the patent holder.
177 Soon after the passage of the amendments to the Patent Act, a working group set up by the
Commerce Ministry was drafting a new definition of "unfair trade restriction" in Section 14 of the Patent
Act, using the Price Fixing and Anti-Monopoly Act as a standard. See Patent licensees to gain
bargaining power from new law, Bangkok Post (June 1, 1992). This proposal was prompted by concern
over attempts by patent holders in the past "to take advantage of their licensees by forcing the licensees to
buy all of their raw materials from them or by fixing the prices of their patent licenses at very high prices
to manipulate the market." Id.
178 See Noguds, 24:6 J World Trade 81 at 89 (cited in note 13).
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technology transfer to the Thai drug industry. 179
One final problem with the U.S. position remains. U.S. firms often
complain about the high cost of research and development. Yet they maintain
that, with the incentive for innovation, the young Thai drug manufacturers will
soon be producing new, patentable, drugs. 180 However, in a young economy
that is still far from being wealthy, it will probably be quite some time before
Thai companies have the financial resources to invest in large-scale research
and development. 181 Western investment might help, but it is questionable
whether patent protection will induce investment. 182 In any event, investment
179 Peter Gakunu, Intellectual Property: Perspective of the Developing World, 19 Ga J Intl &
Comp L 358, 361 (1989). Including drugs in Thailand's patent law might actually restrict the
proliferation of new technology among Thai manufacturing companies. One of the reasons for this
possibility is the high cost of purchasing patented drug technology. Also, the adaptation of that
technology to local economic and technical conditions is hampered by licensing. See Ayhan Cilingiroglu,
Transfer of Technology for Pharmaceutical Chemicals: Synthesis report on the experience of five
industrializing countries 54 (OECD, 1975).
180 On this point, consider the following colloquy:
[Scott Birdwell:] It is my understanding that if some of the developing countries did not
infringe patents and violate copyrights, many of their industries would collapse. In that
vein, the developing countries do not have $125 million to spend on research and
development.. . [demanding increased protection of intellectual property] is like asking
developing countries to protect something they might never have.... My point is that
the industry of the industrial countries is so far beyond the capacity of the industry of the
developing countries that it seems unlikely that the industry of developing countries will
be in a position to spend $125 million to develop a product to compete with a company
like Pfizer. how long are you asking the developing countries to hold off, and is it worth
the wait?
[Mr. Richardson:] Obviously that goes with the whole social and economic
underpinnings of the country and the system they choose to adopt. There is no reason
why what I called stealing should be allowed to continue. I do not see that you can
justify stealing as a means of promoting development.
Panel Two: General Discussion, 19 Ga I Intl & Comp L 366, 371-73 (1989).
Thus the supporters of the PMA position revert to their moral claim, rather than attempting to refute
the argument that a country must be at a certain stage of economic development before a full patent
scheme is warranted. For discussion of the validity of this moral claim, see III.F. of this Comment.
181 It has been suggested that Canada was unable to reach the required research and development
economies of scale. See Henderson and Gorecki, Patent Licensing in Canada 7:4 Can Pub Pol 559, 565
(1981). This could be because Canada did not at the time have U.S.-style patent protection for drugs. It
remains to be seen how successful research and development in Canada will be under a full drug patent
regime.
182 See Patent rights andwrongs, Manager 29 (Sept 24, 1990) ("Opponents [of patent protection for
drugs] believe that foreign companies' promises to invest here are merely a way to play developing
countries off one another, and that most investment and research and development will remain overseas").
It is a large market, rather than patent protection, that warrants increased investment. This, they claim, is
why companies have invested heavily in China, despite its weak patent law. Further support for this
argument is found in the example of Brazil. In 1969, that country abolished patent protection for
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raises concerns about foreign ownership and the need for institutional controls
on the money coming into the country. 183
The Thai government must balance numerous national development
interests. 184  It is in the best position to judge whether Thailand's
pharmaceutical industry is financially ready to become an innovator, and
when it will be able to compete against drug conglomerates with the capital to
set up a research and development facility in Thailand. Only the Thai people
and their government should have the authority to say when the economy is
sufficiently diversified and stable to take one of the last steps to fill-scale
industrialization.' 8 5
Foreign interests pushing for full patent protection should at least be
required to demonstrate that Thailand is economically ready for it. Yet few
commentators do more than recite the litany of standard arguments about
incentives for growth and the necessity of intellectual property protection in a
modem economy. One empirical study that treats the problem in greater
depth, however, supports some relevant observations. 186 Using a six point
scale, on which five indicates the highest level of patent protection and zero
indicates no protection, the writers created a model that used eight
"modernization variables" to predict the level of patent protection that the 87
countries in their survey could be expected to have. They compared their
predictions to the observed level of patent protection. 187 The study did.not
pharmaceuticals, but this move did not deter foreign investment. From 1971 to 1979 in Brazil, "direct
foreign investment in the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry rose from US $11.4 m to US $646.5 m due to
the government's incentives." Preeya Seebunrueang, Drug Patents: who benefits? Manager 5 (Sept 24,
1990)i83 See Ayhan Cilingiroglu at 34-35 (cited in note 179). Portugal, one of the five countries in the
survey, did nothing to limit foreign ownership. As of 1975, locally-owned plants accounted for only 20%
of domestic drug sales.
184 For example, some Thais reject the prevailing development ethos, which they regard as a
"materialistic and quantity-oriented... product of Western civilization." Koson Srisang, Review: Sulak
Sivaraksa, Religion & Development (9th Sinclair Thompson Memorial Lecture, 1976: Francis Seely,
transl, Grant Olson, ed, Thai Inter-religious Commission for Development, 3d ed 2530/1987.) 75 J Siam
Soc 307 (1987).
185 Gakunu, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 358 at 359 (cited in note 179) (suggesting that it is
"inappropriate to require developing countries to adopt any new rules in this area [IP] that may be
inconsistent with their national development interests."). See also Sheila Page, The Role of Trade in the
New NICs, 27:3 J Development Stud 39, 58-59 (1991). Page concludes that, based on the experience of
the East Asian countries, policies imposed from outside the country do not always have the desired effect,
because the domestic commitment to develop plays a crucial role.
186 Rapp and Rozek, 24:5 1 World Trade 75 (cited in note 169).
187 This analysis may be skewed in favor of the premise that patent protection promotes economic
development. This presumption may be incorporated into the structure of their predictive model: "What is
interesting and significant is that the relationship between economic modernity and intellectual property
protection is consistent across the middle of the spectrum; that is, the countries with the stronger patent
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show that Thailand's patent protection lags behind its level of economic
development; on the contrary, the model predicted level one for Thailand,
precisely its observed level.188 Yet the USTR claims that Thailand's patent
law lags far behind its level of economic development, and has consequently
labeled Thailand one of the worst intellectual property offenders in the
world.189
Thailand's growing economy is fragile, and still dependent on trade
with the United States. 190 The United States is Thailand's largest trading
partner, and U.S. merchandise exports to Thailand have increased by roughly
65% from 1989 to 1991, making Thailand a major trading partner of the
United States. 191 For the United States to hinder Thailand's economic growth
systems experienced more rapid development." Id at 79. This statement and their conclusions about the
reasons for the relationship reveals a possible inversion of cause and effect: one could argue that the
economically modern countries began to adopt strong intellectual property laws once they had reached a
certain level of development, diversity and structural stability; the combination of the strong base and the
intellectual property incentives took the United States and other countries into the era of rapid innovation
and mass consumerism. There seems to be no convincing evidence that Thailand has reached such a base.
It should be up to the Thai people to decide when they are ready for stronger patent, copyright and
trademark protection.
188 Id. at 80-83. Level one means "[i]nadequate protection laws, no law prohibiting piracy."
189 For example, the President of the PMA recently commented that "Thailand is becoming
increasingly isolated in the world community of nations, especially among the newly industrializing
countries of north and southeast Asia." Pornpimol Kanchanalak, US to press new govt to amend patent
law, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 4 col 2 (Mar 27, 1992).
190 D. Fagan, Trade strategy aimed at creating economic hub for Indochina, The [Toronto] Globe
& Mail B22 (Dec 19, 1989); US trade action prompts review of export policy, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev
11 (May 10, 1991); O'Neill, 11 U Pa J Intl Bus L 603 at 604 (cited in note 11).
191 The 1990, 1991 and 1992 National Trade Estimates. These reports provide the following
figures (in billions of U.S current dollars, rounded to one tenth of a billion):
U.S. Trade U.S. Exports Thai World Thai Exports U.S. Direct
Deficit with to Thailand Rank in U.S. to U.S. Investment in
Year Thailand (Merchandise) Exports (Merchandise) Thailand
1988 1.3 2.0 nil 3.2 1.1
1989 2.1 2.3 28th 4.4 1.3
1990 2.3 3.0 25th 5.3 1.5
1991 2.4 3.8 23rd 6.1 nil
In the period from 1988 through 1990, exports to the United States accounted for 20 percent of Thai
exports, making the United States Thailand's top export market. Thailand in World Trade, 83 Focus -
GATT Newsletter 4 (Aug 1991); PM says Section 301 no longer a big threat, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev
(Aug 27, 1989); Thailand gains little from US duty exemption-bank report Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 18
(Nov 9, 1990); and US trade action prompts review of export policy, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 11 (May
10, 1991).
In the past several years, the United States has ranked third in annual investment in Thailand,
behind Japan and Taiwan. Janssen, A Slower But Surer Species of Asian Tiger, Asian Business 72, 73
(June 1988), cited in Thomas N. O'Neill III, Intellectual Property Protection in Thailand: Asia's Young
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in the name of improved trade would be hanful to U.S. long-term interests.
The insistence of the PMA and others that the USTR initiate Section 301
trade sanctions despite the Thai government's efforts to accommodate U.S.
demands betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the level of Thailand's
development.
B. Regulatory and Structural Considerations
As a nation becomes an industrial state, its government must evolve in
order to meet new societal needs. 192 Western countries themselves are still
learning how to govern in many areas, particularly those of pollution control,
health care, consumer protection and competition regulation, taxation, and
resource use. It is unreasonable for the United States to demand that
Thailand take one of the last steps toward industrialization-strict regulation in
the area of patents-without first allowing it to learn how to govern as an
industrialized society.
Contrary to the careful, measured, internally-directed development that
would be most likely to yield a stable, healthy economy in Thailand, the
United States would have Thailand immediately copy American laws that
evolved over many years. These laws were developed by U.S. citizens in the
context of the U.S. economy, to be administered by a government capable of
regulating the economy. In short, they were appropriate for the United States
at the time they were adopted, 193 but, as the foregoing discussion shows,
Tiger andAmerica's 'Growing' Concern, 11 U PaJ Intl Bus L 603, at 604 n 3 (1990).
The United States remains the largest foreign investor in Thailand, however, with approximately $4
billion invested. American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, Country Paper - October 1989, in
Business and Investments in Thailand (Tilleke and Gibbins, 1990).
192 For a general discussion of structural and regulatory issues in Thailand, see George Abonyi and
Bunyarakis Ninsananda, Global Change and Economic Restructuring in Southeast Asia: The Changing
Context of Thai-Canada Relations (U of Toronto Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1991).
193 See Dhanjee and Boisson de Chazournes, 24:5 J World Trade 5, 8 (cited in note 168). They
point out that the United States was a leading "pirate" of English works in the 19th centmuy. They cite B.
Kaplan and R. Brown, Cases on Copyright, Unfair Competition and Other Topics bearing on the
Protection of Literary, Musical andArtistic Works Part IV (rev ed 1978) on this point. They state that the
United States maintained, until 1986, a "manufacturing clause" requiring that works be first published in
the United States to qualify for protection (this was the subject of an adverse ruling by a GATT panel).
Thus, this freedom [of economic self-determination under the intellectual property conventions and the
GATT] has been used by States to promote their national technological and industrial development. In
order to do so, they have attempted to find a proper balance between the encouragement of creativity, and
the maximization of social welfare arising from the diffusion of the fruits of that creativity, and from free
competition and trade. Such a balance underlies all national legislation on [intellectual property rights].
The manufacturing clause is remarkably similar to Tiailand's compulsory licensing of drugs, with two
differences. First, one can argue that there is more of a social loss to a society deprived of a revolutionary
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Thailand is not ready for these laws, nor is it clear that the U.S. regulatory
model would ever be appropriate.
Moreover, even if Thailand's economy were sufficiently healthy to
support drug patent protection, other problems relating to the process of
industrialization may have to be addressed before a sophisticated patent
protection regime can be developed. 194 For example, one Western news
article reports that "Thailand will one day join the ranks of newly
industrialized countries, but only when it closes the growing gap between the
urban rich and the rural poor."195  Family planning and other population
control programs may be necessary to help the Thai economy shift from a
rural to an urban base. Since they have already undergone such a shift,
developed countries, or other developing countries, may provide solutions
that Thailand can implement. Implementation will require the support of the
people, so the government will have to promote acceptance of the programs
among the populace. None of this can be done immediately. This example
illustrates how culture, the economy and governmental structure are crucial to
a country's development choices. And its lessons apply to other areas of the
Thai infrastructure as well, such as environmental protection.196
Thailand will require national, harmonized regulation of competition
and consumer transactions, local and foreign investment, labor and the other
facets of an industrialized country. Most important in the pharmaceutical and
new drug because its manufacturer either will not market it in the country (for, e.g., cost reasons) or who
charges too high a price for it. Second, given the importance of the U.S. market to any trader of goods, it
is unlikely that a person will not market a new product there. On the other hand, Thailand is a much
smaller market, so the potential for a new product not being sold there for several years after introduction
to the world market is quite high.
194 This point is especially important in light of the shift in North American attitudes of the past
twenty years. Increasingly, North Americans (and citizens of all industrialized countries) are questioning
the development ethos that has left us with environmental problems that we may not be able to resolve, an
urban landscape that many find appalling, a considerable "underclass" of people dependent on state
welfare programs for their survival, and numerous other problems. See, for example, H. Cleveland, We
Changed Our Minds in the 1970s at 4, and D. Yankelovich and B. Leikowitz, The Public Debate About
Growth at 22-25, 31 and 45, both in H. Cleveland, ed, The Management of Sustainable Growth
(Pergamon Press, 1981). It seems odd that, at a time when the industrialized nations are struggling to
solve the problems they have wrought, they should be encouraging less developed countries to follow their
path at all, much less at an accelerated pace.
195 Conrad Leitch, 'Condom king' takes on problem of income gap, The [Toronto] Globe & Mail
B21 (Dec 19, 1989). For the political importance of preventing a rich/poor schism in Thailand, see Paul
Handley, Wind from the South, Far Eastern Economic Review 22 (Aug 9, 1990), and Paul Handley, Deep
Grievances, Far Eastern Economic Review 23 (Aug 9, 1990).
196 Deforestation and overfishing are epidemic in Thailand. See D. Ward, A Fight for the forests,
The Vancouver Sun F3 (Oct 4, 1990). In this article, Ward comments that, despite a growing
environmental awareness in the country, the Thai government is still unable to protect the forests, even
with measures as dramatic as a ban on commercial logging.
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health care context is Thailand's need to further develop and coordinate health
care services, from the level of the rural village to the urban centers.
Availability and prices of drugs vary from region to region in Thailand; such
disparity will be exacerbated if Thailand does not deal with these problems
before it changes its patent laws, and before it's economy progresses
further. 197
As suggested above, the Thai government will have to learn how to
develop its own regulatory structures itself from North America, Europe,
South America, and the Asian countries, especially the four tigers. The
experience of countries that have been industrialized for as long as a century
will be valuable in avoiding unnecessary pitfalls and setbacks in reshaping the
Thai government, but no foreign regulatory system can be imported whole.
To do so would alienate the Thai people and make the new structure
impotent. 198 Instead, internal change is necessary at a more fundamental
level, from which a new economy and structure can be built.199
The U.S. strategy of forcing Thailand to adopt the intellectual property
laws that the PMA wants, with a minor implementation period tacked on,200
will not produce the desired results. Legislation, without the institutions to
adequately administer it and without the regulatory structure to handle the
effects of the resulting change in the economy, will only delay Thailand's
gradual development toward a society that is ready for such harbingers of
industrialization as patented drugs. It is difficult to understand how
spokespeople for the U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers can dismiss such
considerations as "the stalling tactics of pirates."201 The PMIA members seem
to be unwilling to take into consideration how long it has taken the
197 See, for example, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Health &
Development in Asia and the Pacific: Two Studies at 61-78, 89, 91 and 102 (ESCAP). See also
Cilingirogu at 50-51 and 105-06 (cited in note 179), on the coordination of technology transfer.
98 See II.C. infra.
199 This does not mean that Thailand should try to transform itself into a Western country, but that,
if the Thai government decides to maintain the country's present rate of development, it must restructure
itself based on the lessons from the West in conjunction with characteristics unique to Thailand. See
Gakunu, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 358 at 364 (cited in note 179). See also Ken Scott, Review: Sulak
Sivaraksa, A Socially Engaged Buddhism (Suksit Siai, 1988), 76 J Siam Soc 351 (1988). Scott comments
that, while Sulak admits that, in Thailand, "economics and money have more power than religious norms
now, and that Buddhism might be more suited to traditional agrarian Siam, . there is hope for a
meaningful Buddhist re-engagement in public life."
200 Michel M. Kostecki, Sharing Intellectual Property Between the Rich and the Poor, 8 Eur Intell
Prop Rev 271 at 273 (1991). This concession is the closest most commentators come to recognizing that
there is far more to economic development than enacting the same legislation that the United States has.
201 Bilzi, 19 Ga J Intl Comp L 343 at 347 (cited in note 22).
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industrialized countries to develop the systems that they insist Thailand adopt
immediately.
C. Socio-Cultural Considerations
In order to successfully implement amendments to the Patent Act, the
Thai government will need support from the public.2 02 Any government that
appears to be knuckling under to foreign pressure is all too likely to lose
credibility with its populace. This is especially true in Thailand.
It is sometimes observed that Thais do not appear to have great respect
for written, formal law.203 One of the causes of this apparent disrespect may
be that the law does not seem relevant to them, because the Thai people have
for centuries regulated their conduct with traditional rules and dispute
mechanisms, 204 and because much of the Thai written law developed in the
past century has been in response to pressure from the colonial powers,
including England, France, and later, the United States.205 If Thais reject
formal laws that do not coincide with their customary behavior,206 they are
doubly unlikely to accept a law that they view as a capitulation to Western
demands.
Observers in the news media have provided a good deal of evidence to
support this position. The Montreal Gazette reported that Thai political
activists opposed the patent law reforms, citing "the Philippines as an
example of a country that gave in to U.S. demands on drug patents and now
must pay higher prices for basic health care."20 7 The concept of a political
activist in a country that typically is almost indifferent to themachinations of
the government is indicative the strength of the sentiment among Thai
people.208 Even officials in the Thai government resent the U.S. demands.
202 A useful analysis of the link between Thailand's social and cultural character and its
developmental path is found in Sippanondha Ketudat, The Middle Path for the Future of Thailand.-
Technology in Harmony with Culture and Environment (East-West Center, 1990).
203 William J. Klausner, Reflections on Thai Culture 190 (The Siam Society, 2d ed 1983).
204 R. Lingat, Evolution of the Conception of Law in Burma and Siam, 38 J Siam Soc 9, 9-10
(195015 Borwarnsak Uwanno and Dr. Surikiart Sathirathai, Introduction to the Thai Legal System, 4
Chula L Rev 40, 42-46. In the criminal law context, see A. Petchsiri, Eastern Importation of Western
Criminal Law: Thailand as a Case Study 181-83 (Rothman & Co., 1987).
206 Uwanno and Sathirathai, 4 Chula L Rev 40 at 48-49.
207 P. Gorton, Bangkok has become the fake-Gucci, phoney-Rolex capital of the world, The
[Montreal] Gazette B4 (May 21, 1989).
208 The May 1992 demonstrations throughout the country may indicate that Thai culture is
changing. The protests are not a response to capitulation to U.S. interests, but such violent activism
among the Thais will make the USTR's mission much more difficult. The riots may indicate that the Thai
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Chalaw Fuangaromya, the Director-General of Thailand's Department of
Export Promotion, complained that Thailand "can't inflict any damage on the
U.S. economy, but they can certainly inflict damage on us."209  Rather than
passive indifference toward a proposed law that Thai people plan to ignore
anyway, the intellectual property issues have become quite a source of
contention in the country.210 There is no doubt that the government will have
difficulty enforcing the patent amendments if it makes an effort to do so. Its
difficulty enforcing the copyright legislation is indicative of the cultural
barrier to intellectual property rights in Thailand.211
Beyond enforcement, the intractability of the United States on the issue
of patent protection has offended many Thais. 212 U.S.-Thai relations,
people are becoming more concerned about what the goverunent does, and more critical of its actions.
Such an attitude is new to Thais. See Ann Danaiya Usher, Bangkok showdown for democracy, The
[Toronto] Globe & Mail A17 (May 21, 1992). It is not unreasonable to suggest that this activism has
come about partly in response to the U.S. pressure of the past five years. Certainly, few political issues
have raised such public outcry as the recent patent amendments. See note 128 and accompanying text.
209 V. Amorn, Thais spend millions tojoinAsian 'Tigers', Calgary Herald C14 (Aug 11, 1989).
210 The government itself has been placed at risk of a popular coup when it has given in to United
States pressure in the past. In April of 1988, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda had to dissolve "his
cabinet after a dispute over proposed unpopular copyright legislation." O'Neill, It U Pa J Intl Bus L 603
at 606 n 34 (cited in note 11). See also Paul Handley, Wind from the South, Far Eastern Economic
Review 22 (Aug 9, 1990); and Paul Handley, Deep Grievances, Far Eastern Economic Review 23 (Aug 9,
1990). See also note 128 and accompanying text.
211 Thailand's copyright law, unlike its patent law, is not of itself considered unacceptable by the
United States. The problem is primarily enforcement. Thai people ignore the law, officials feel no
compunction to enforce it, and judges are-reluctant to convict. Perhaps the greatest problem is the Thai
court system, which makes conviction in a copyright case "virtually impossible," largely because the
judges throw most cases out for lack of evidence that the complainant is protecting or using its copyright
in Thailand. See Bush, Anand to discuss probe on copyright issue, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 20 (Dec 20,
1991); USTR seeks reprisal comment on Thailand, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev (Nov 29, 1991); Pornpimol
Kanchanalak, New complaints keep Thais on list for US trade action, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 11, col 5
(May 8, 1992). See also AmCham asks USTR to delay Sect 301 action, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev (Dec
27, 1991); Thai-US meeting fails to resolve copyright issue, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 2 (July 5, 1991);
Intellectual Property: Senators, Copyright Industries Criticize Thailand'sAlleged Failure to Stop Piracy,
7 Intl Trade Rep 854 (June 13, 1990).
212 Signs that Thais have taken offense at the U.S. position can be seen in the rhetoric adopted by
some Thai political figures and by opponents of the amendments to the Patent Act. See generally the
references accompanying the section of this comment on U.S. Section 301 pressure on Thailand (II.C.3.b.
supra). The anger of some Thais over the U.S. stance frequently translated into anger at Thai government
officials who were handling the negotiations; those officials were often accused of being unaware of "how
much ordinary villagers will be affected by" the amendments. Groups want public hearing on patents,
Bangkok Post Weekly Rev (Dec 20, 1991). See also Minister puts job on line over US trade reprisals,
Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 11 (Nov 29, 1991); United stance needed against US-minister, Bangkok Post
Weekly Rev 13 (May 24, 1991), (indicating former Commerce Minister Amaret's frustration in trying to
accommodate the U.S. demands while being called a traitor by some doctors, pharmacists and
non-governmental organizations); and Ex-MPs call on US to delay 301 sanctions Bangkok Post Weekly
Rev 5 (May 10, 1991) (describing a student protest against capitulation to U.S. interests). The unrest in
1988 over the proposed amendments to the copyright bill (described at II.C.I. supra) likely fueled
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diplomatic and private, have already been damaged in the process of
negotiating for revision of the Thai Patent Act.213 Relations will only get
worse if the USTR and the PMA continue to attempt to impose their will
upon the Thai people. The climate for American investment in Thailand
could well become gloomy over the next few years. 214
From a socio-cultural perspective, then, the United States has
presented the Thai government with a "catch-22."215 The Thai government
resentment toward the United States. See Surin Pitsuwan, Copyright bill now more of a "political
plaything," Bangkok Post 6 (Apr 28, 1988) and Surin Pitsuwan, Democrat MP recounts battle over
copyright, Bangkok Post 2 (Apr 30, 1988).
2c13 See generally K.B. Richburg, Trade issues put strain on U.S.-Thai relations, Calgary Herald
H12 (February 23, 1989). A specific example of harm to diplomatic relations is found in signs that
Thailand is seeking to become less dependent on trade with the United States. See US trade action
prompts review of export policy, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 5 (May 10, 1991). During the negotiations
with the United States, the Thai delegation displayed animosity toward the United States. At one point,
"some Thai officials threatened that should the US list Thailand [as a priority foreign country under
Section 301], all previous discussions, agreements and commitments would be 'off the table.'" See
Pornpimol Kanchanalak, US: Settlement key issue, not delegates, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 5 (June 28,
1991). See also Ratchaphol Laovanitch, US pharmaceutical move upsets Thai Govt, Bangkok Post 13
(February 2, 1991) (indicating that, despite the PMA petitions to have Thailand designated a priority
foreign country, Thai officials never really expected the U.S. government to accept the petitions). The
Thai Commerce Permanent Secretary at the time said that "it was not useful to pressure Thailand in this
way because it might hamper trade relations between the two countries." Id.
This warning may prove true. Subsequent to the amendments to the Patent Act and the U.S.
criticisms of them (Pornpimol Kanchanalak, US to press new govt to amend patent law, Bangkok Post
Weekly Rev 4 col 2 (Mar 27, 1992)), some Thai officials have hinted that they would consider repealing
the Amity Treaty (Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations (May 29, 1966), United States-Thailand, 19
UST 5843, TIAS No 6540 ("Amity Treaty"). Peter Mytri Ungphakorn, Saranrom Palace rethinks
US--Thai relations, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 18 (Mar 20, 1992). This treaty provides preferential
treatment to U.S. companies wishing to operate in Thailand. The article states that "the request to revise
the treaty, which either party can terminate with one year's notice, is also apparently motivated by
resentment of continual US trade pressure." It also points out that the Thai Foreign Ministry was
pressuring the Ministry of Defense to loosen its ties with the United States, while Commerce Ministry
officials, long bearing "the brunt of US pressure," were in turn pressuring the Foreign Ministry to
restructure its ties with Washington; the Amity Treaty suggestion was one form of restructuring. See also
Pornpimol Kanchanalak, US to press new govt to amend patent law, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 4 col 2
(Mar 27, 1992) ("[Prime Minister's Office Minister M.R. Kasem] said that Thailand will not retaliate but
would have to reconsider her position vis-A-vis the U.S., which dealt much more leniently with China
and India on the same issue [patent and copyright law]. [Kasem then warned that] Thailand also has
ASEAN support."). An editorial in Asiaweek suggests that much of Southeast Asia is willing to resist
further U.S. pressure. See Editorial, No such thing as bilateral free trade, Asiaweek 30 (Oct 30, 1992),
reprinted in the Bangkok newspaper, The Nation A6 (Oct 30, 1992) ("Washington's bluster about free
trade is a sideshow. Its sudden enthusiasm for 'bilateral free trdde'-just when GATT is starting again-is
as much evidence as any trader needs that what it really wants is 'managed trade."').
214 Thus far, there is no sign of a change in U.S. investment in Thailand. See note 191. However,
there are signs of growing hostility toward the United States among Thai officials. See notes 125,
231-333 and accompanying text. Exception is taken to U.S. paternalism: "Thai industry and consumer
groups also resent the 'we know what's good for you' attitude of foreign critics." Patent rights and wrongs,Manager 29 (Sept 24, 1990).
15 The Thai government's predicament is apparent in many of the news reports. The government
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faces only two courses of action: (1) accept the U.S. demands and further
alienate your populace, thereby slowing down the process of developing the
legal structures necessary to control the effects of industrialization, or (2)
refuse to change the patent law and face the crippling sanctions that your
biggest trading partner will visit upon you. Under such circumstances, there
is no way Thailand can win.
D. The U.S. Position and the Principle of Trade
Trade, it is suggested, is the exchange of one value for another.216 In
the context of bilateral negotiations among nations, trade can include the
elimination by nation A of barriers to entry into its market in exchange for a
similar change in nation B's trade laws or practices, the elimination of A's
trade barriers in exchange for the adoption by B of a law that benefits
companies from A, 217 or the creation in each country of laws that facilitate
has been forced to respond to the opposing demands of the United States and the Thai people. See notes
130-3 1. Some representative examples are found in Ex-MPs call on US to delay 301 sanctions, Bangkok
Post Weekly Rev 5 (May 10, 1991); United stance needed against US-minister, Bangkok Post Weekly
Rev 13 (May 24, 1991); Cabinet likely to decide on key drug patent issue, Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 13
(Sept 27 1991); Anti-Patents drive hots up with issue of "white paper," Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 13
(Nov 29, 199 1), read in conjunction with Minister puts job on line over US trade reprisals, Bangkok Post
Weekly Rev 11 (Nov 29, 1991); and for India, Intellectual Property: Indian Trade Minister Hopeful Talks
With U.S. Will Lead To Removal From Special 301 List, 8 Intl Trade Rep 645 (May 1, 1991).
216 The point here is to distinguish trade from coercion. The United States is leaving Thailand this
choice: surrender your public policy on drugs or lose considerable trade revenue. The United States is
offering nothing positive; it is coercing.2 17 The United States could certainly have offered to provide less restricted access for Thai
companies to certain U.S. markets in exchange for protection of patents in Thailand. The United States
has myriad trade barriers with which to bargain. Consider this statement of then-Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative Alan Holmer to the Senate Committee on Finance:
I can imagine how I would feel if a foreign government official from Country-X came
into our offices at the USTR, stuck a retaliation gun to our head, and said, "We're tired
of the U.S. trade practices that we, unilaterally in Country-X, have decided are unfair.
We want you to get rid of your steel quotas, your quotas on sugar and meat and dairy
products and peanuts and cotton and sugar-containing products and machine tools, we
want you to get rid of your Buy-America provisions and your agricultural export
subsidies and your price support programs and your Superfund taxes and your custom
user fees. We don't like the way you administer the dumping and countervailing duty
law, we believe that is unjustifiable. You've got to change those practices. Get rid of
Section 337, certainly get rid of your extraterritorial technology controls, get rid of the
semiconductor third country anti-dumping agreement, do it all in 15 months.. .-- do it
in the glare of the public spotlight, and if you don't, on all of those things we are going
to whack you.
Improving Enforcement of Trade Agreements: Hearing on S 490, S 539 and HR 3 Before the Senate
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trade between the nations. 218 It can also entail removal of subsidies and other
supports that give one nation an advantage in the world market in the
subsidized sector. The goal of such trades is to remove discriminatory
policies that give one country an advantage over others that is not based on
differences in resources, skill, or on other competitive superiority. One nation
might benefit more than the other, but both benefit nevertheless.
Countries enter such negotiations willingly, in the expectation that their
competitive industries will, as a result, expand their presence in the world
marketplace. Frequently in developing-and even developed-countries, there
may be "infant industries" that need continued protection before they reach a
size that allows them to be competitive in their native country and beyond.
These industries are often exempted from such trade-offs in the negotiation
process. 219
The United States has not adopted this approach in its trade
negotiations with Thailand. The USTR, acting on behalf of the PMIA and
other private sector interests, has effectively told Thailand to comply or suffer
economic hardship. 220 Thailand has not come willingly to the negotiations,
ready to listen to the requests of the United States, ready to discuss ways of
changing the laws of both countries, in intellectual property and in other
areas.221 On the contrary, Thailand has been coerced into acquiescing to the
United States' demand that it change its law immediately, regardless of
popular resistance and regardless of the costs, not in exchange for U.S.
concessions on a trade issue such as rice,222 but in return for the United
Committee on Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess 108 (1987) at 12, quoted in Steven R. Phillips, The New
Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Trade Wars or Open Markets? 22
Vand J Transnatl L 491, 525 (1989).
218 The Amity Treaty (cited in note 213) is an example of such an agreement.
219 Even radically pro-free trade economists concede that protectionism will assist in the growth of
infant industries.2 2 0 See J. McMillan, Strategic Bargaining and Section 301, Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh T. Patrick,
eds, Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System at 169 (U Mich
Press, 1990).
221 This point is supported in the sections which discuss Thailand's reluctance to amend its
copyright law (II.C.1. supra), which resulted in revocation of some of its GSP benefits, and in its initial
refusal to take the threat of Section 301 sanctions seriously (PM says Section 301 no longer a big threat
Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 3 (Aug 27, 1989)). Only after Thailand remained on the USTR's Special 301
priority watch list after the 150 day review period did the Thai government begin to respond to the
unilateral U.S. pressure. Get-tough body being formed to monitor patents Bangkok Post Weekly Rev 12
(July 20, 1990).
222 The contradiction in the U.S. position on drug patents in Thailand and its position on rice
subsidies was outlined in a presentation by David Lyman, a partner at Tilleke & Gibbins in Bangkok, at
the Third U.S.-Thailand Bilateral Trade Forum (San Francisco, April 1989):
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States' promise not to use Section 301 against it.223 It is not simply a demand
that the country open its markets to U.S. fimns; it is a demand that Thailand
surrender a measure of its autonomy.
E. The Effect of the U.S. Position on U.S. Interests
In demanding that Thailand protect drug patents, the PMA and the
United States government must believe that they are acting in their best
interests. But what will the United States gain, and at what cost? Even
assuming the amended Thai Patent Act is enforced rigorously, the PMA's
gains may turn out to be less than it expects, while the cost to U.S. business
interests and other U.S. interests in Thailand could be great.
224
The PMA estimates that the potential sales of its members in Thailand
are less than one half what they would be with full patent protection.225 One
must be wary of the accuracy of these estimates, however, for two reasons.
First, because the figures may not properly account for minimal sales due to
the inaccessibility to most Thais of expensive, monopolized drugs. Second,
In simplest terms, the U.S. position on intellectual property rights is [that] they must
have a solution on intellectual property rights now. On rice, they said let's wait until
they get to GATT, so we can handle subsidies all at once. The Thai position is just the
opposite. On intellectual property rights, let's wait for GATT so we can have it on a
worldwide basis. But on rice, let's handle that one now. The real issue ... is [that] the
United States and Thailand are unable to get by that impasse in their negotiations that
I'vejust described. Thailand... believes that when you reach that kind of situation you
try to make a deal. You give here, you push there, you get this, you give up that. The
United States is unable to do that. They cannot come up with a package deal. Now, the
mechanics of why they cannot I do not fully understand. The feeling within the
Administration and within the Congress is that each issue must be handled and won or
lost on its own substantive merits. You cannot link one issue to another to make a deal.
223 The crucial difference between this viewpoint and that of the supporters of the U.S. position is
that the latter group seems to consider the lack of patent protection to be an unfair trade barrier put up by
Thailand. If that were the case, it would not be unreasonable for the United States to threaten to put up
corresponding barriers unless the Thai barrier was removed. The lack of patent protection is not a
discriminatory barrier that gives an unfair advantage to Thai companies.
224 Developing this point further, trying to improve access to foreign markets for certain sectors
(such as the pharmaceutical industry) endangers the overall trade balance, as outlined in H. Milner, The
Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy: A Study of the Super 301 Provision, in Jagdish Bhagwati and
Hugh T. Patrick, eds, Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading
System at 169 (U Mich Press, 1990).
225 See Pompimol Kanchanalak, US to press new Govt to anend patent law, Bangkok Post Weekly
Rev 4 col 2 (Mar 27, 1992). PMA President Gerold Mossinghoff claims that PMA member companies
had sales totaling $12 million (306 million baht) in 1991. The PMA estimates the revenue lost due to
"patent piracy" at $19 million (484.5 million baht). The latter figure is presumably the estimate for 1991.
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the estimates do not seem to allow for the set-up costs of the new
manufacturing and research facilities that the U.S. firms ostensibly will build
in Thailand. Even if the industry figures are accurate, the benefit to the big
drug firms may not be significant. For example, as one commentator notes,
"Pfizer International Corporation has stated that it earned $2.2 million in 1984
on twelve of the U.S.-patented products it sells in Thailand, while copies of
the same products earned other companies $4.2 million in the same
period."226  Yet in 1990 alone, Pfizer's drug "Procardia," with a patent
expiring in 1991, had world wholesale revenue of $727 million.227 A
potential increase in gross sales-for twelve patented drugs-of two to four
million dollars is not a staggering figure when one considers the worldwide
volume of trade in patented drugs. 228 Regardless of their size, these potential
financial gains should be considered in light of two factors: whether they are a
gain that could be obtained in the long term without resorting to unilateral
pressure, and whether they justify the immediate harm that trade sanctions
could wreak on Thailand's economy and on U.S.-Thai relations.
Thailand is changing, economically and socially. Even supporters of
the U.S. position acknowledge that the changes demanded by the USTR are
likely to evolve naturally.229 As Thailand develops, it will cease to be a
pirating capital, just as Japan, and Taiwan and Hong Kong had their turns at
pirating and then moved on in the late 1960s and 1970s.230 Consequently, the
United States may be forcing a natural development to happen unnaturally
fast. In addition to the potential economic and structural consequences for
Thailand mentioned above, the U.S. tactics present other, more direct dangers
to the United States. The strain on U.S.-Thai relations is likely to make
future trade negotiations, private and diplomatic, difficult.231 Thai officials,
226 O'Neill, 11 U Pa J Intl Bus L 603 at 608 (cited in note 11).
227 O'Reilly, 124 Fortune 48 at 50 (cited in note 23).
228 This, without more, is no argument against obtaining several million dollars more in revenue
each year. The potential gains from obtaining patent protection in Thailand, however, should be put into
perspective before they are compared to their potential costs.
229 For a discussion of natural progress toward copyright protection in Asia, see Altbach, Economic
Progress Brings Copyright to Asia, Far Eastern Economic Review 62, 63 (Mar 3, 1988) and Altbach,
Toward a Worldwide Copyright Era, Publisher's Weekly 44 (Dec 11, 1987).
230 p. Gorton, Bangkok has become the fake-Gucci, phoney--Rolex capital of the world, The
[Montreal] Gazette B4 (May 21, 1989). Japan did not recognize product patents until 1975 (OECD, The
Pharmaceutical Industry at 39 (cited in note 23)); today it is one of the strongest supporters of U.S.
intellectual property efforts. If allowed to progress without intervention Thailand could become such an
ally, but the current U.S. pressure can only create tension between the two nations.
231 With the emergence of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (see ASEAN crawls into free trade today,
The [Toronto] Globe & Mail B13 (Jan 1, 1993); and Pearl Imada, Manual Montes and Seiji Naya, A Free
Trade Area: ImplicationsforASEAN (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991)), Thailand may soon be
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under domestic pressure not to appear as puppets of the United States, may
begin to resist U.S. demands. 232 Thailand could well counter-retaliate
against Section 301 action.233 Facing unreasonable demands with even more
unreasonable time constraints designed to force it to take action it considers
unnecessary and even harmful to Thailand's interests, the Thai government
may place real trade barriers in the path of U.S. exports and investment. In
view of the extreme tactics the United States has chosen, one wonders
whether the United States is really weighing the long-term benefits against
the long-term costs of forcing Thailand to change its formal patent law.
F. Moral Claims to Intellectual Property Protection
Thailand has "inadequate" protection; its laws foster "imitators" who
"pirate" Western ideas, thus depriving the "owners" of "intellectual property
rights" of those "rights" and thereby "distorting and restricting" international
trade;234 thus have the supporters of the PMA characterized the state of
patent law in Thailand.
Such language seeks to place the supporters of the U.S. position on the
moral high ground, assuming a basis for patent law in moral concepts of
property. There is no such high ground, however; the patent law of the
United States is based much more on public policy than on a moral concept of
property.235 There are many concepts of intellectual property in the world;
backed up by five other Asian nations in its dealings with the United States. If so, the United States will
have considerable difficulty obtaining compliance with its demands in ASEAN. Sentiment against the
U.S. bilateral stance is strong in Southeast Asia. See, for example, Editorial, No such thing as bilateral
free trade, Asiaweek 30 (Oct 30, 1992), reprinted in the Bangkok newspaper, The Nation A6 (30 Oct
1992)i32 See McMillan, Strategic Bargaining and Section 301 at 211-14 (cited in note 220) for a
game-theoretic discussion of the effect of Section 301 on negotiating efficiency.
233 See note 215. Thailand has considered revoking the Thailand-United States Amity Treaty in
response to the U.S. pressure. Additionally, consider this comment by an analyst at the Thai Farmers
Bank: "the [potential] GSP suspension, however, might result in a negative impact on US exports in
return. Take the textile sector, the US might suspend the GSP on Thai exports, if considering the high
value of Thai exports in the sector. But the US government has to think about US cotton imports in
Thailand as well." USto hold offon trade action, The Nation Al (Oct 11, 1992).
234 These phrases appear throughout the literature on intellectual property and international trade.
Bilzi, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 343 (cited in note 22); Richardson, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 352 (cited in
note 33); and Panel Two: General Discussion, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 366 (1989), use some of the most
provocative language in describing the intellectual property law of developing countries. See also Deborah
Mall, The Inclusion of a Trade Related Intellectual Property Code Under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GAT7), 30 Santa Clara L Rev 265 (1990).
235 It is in the area of copyright law that the moral argument is, perhaps, strongest, as suggested by
the longer period of protection usually afforded to copyrighted works (in Canada, the United States and
most Western countries the copyright lasts the author's lifetime plus fifty years (17 USC § 302 (1992);
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none is universal. Each country must base its law on its own conditions, and
as these conditions change, so must the law.2 36 When, during a panel
discussion, a supporter of the PMA stated that "[w]hat are generally accepted
as violations of intellectual property laws should not continue," another
speaker responded that "the question is, [w]hose intellectual property law [are
we] talking about? The United States has intellectual property laws that
protect certain knowledge and products such as pharmaceuticals. Another
country might consider that pharmaceutical technology is knowledge that
belongs to society in general." 237
With evocative language, many commentators imply that intellectual
property protection is an unqualified, immutable moral right, fundamental to
any modem society. To do so obscures the origin of the patent system in
Copyright Act, RSC 1985, ch C-42, § 6)) and by the universality of enforcement of copyright-unlike a
patent, one need not register a work in order to obtain copyright; the right is automatic on the completion
of a work, and is enforceable in all countries party to the Berne Convention (17 USC § 104(b) (1992);
Copyright Act, RSC 1985, ch C-45, § 5).
There are two types of rights in copyright. Parties to the Berne Convention (including Thailand)
protect them both. There are economic rights (exclusivity of use, sale, etc.: 17 USC § 106) and there are
moral rights. Moral rights can vary somewhat, but in the United States they mean the right of the author
to claim or disclaim authorship of the work, and to prevent distortion, mutilation or modification, or the
deliberate or negligent destruction of the work (17 USC § 106A (1992); Copyright Act, RSC 1985, ch
C-45, §§ 28.1 and 28.2). However, the United States has only protected moral rights since December 1,
1990, when Congress passed 17 USC § 106A. This legislation was necessary, because the United States
had become a party to the Berne Convention on March 1, 1989 (see note 236 infra). The failure to protect
moral rights does not, it is true, necessarily vitiate a moral basis for the economic rights the United States
has long protected. But it does undermine somewhat the claim of the supporters of the U.S. position that
intellectual property is and should be a moral imperative.
236 This self-interested approach to intellectual property law and international agreements is
precisely the one historically adopted by the United States. Thus the United States was once famous for its
violations of copyrights (see note 194), and thus the United States refused to sign the Berne Convention
for more than a century, maintaining that certain of its provisions did not suit the U.S. economy or
structure. In 1988, the United States did consent to join the Convention (effective May 1, 1989),
apparently in order not to appear hypocritical in demanding that all countries adhere to one international
set of minimum standards. US Joins Berne Convention, IP Asia 15 (Nov 25, 1988); Inglis, The United
States Legislates Its Way Into Berne, 1989 Suffolk Transnatl L J 282 (1989). The appearance of
hypocrisy is not so easily dismissed, however. Consider this statement made by Bilzi, 19 Ga J Intl &
Comp L 343 at 349 (cited in note 22): "the Berne Convention is a good model for the fundamental
principles of copyright, while the Paris Convention is not a good model for patents [therefore, we need a
GATT agreement more stringent than the Paris Convention]." The United States was an original
signatory to the latter convention, but not to the former "good model," because this model did not suit U.S.
interests. Also consider the following statements by Kirk, 50 Albany L Rev 601 at 605-06 (cited in note
162): "Harmonization is a give and take proposition, and we are going to try to argue and defend those
areas of our law that, although different, we believe are best for the United States.... Assuming that it [a
GATT agreement or new Paris Convention] can be negotiated in a way that we believe is in our best
interest, we would adhere to it. The real question is: how can we get the other countries, whose standards
are much too low, to adhere?"
237 Panel Two: General Discussion, 19 Ga J Intl & Comp L 366 at 373 (1989).
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Western countries. The goal of a patent system is to stimulate creativity-the
inventor's right of exclusive use or sale is incentive to invent, while the state
initially gains the benefit of the invention's use plus the knowledge made
public when the patent is published 23s and later gains the free use of the new
process or product, since "the owner is required to hand it over to the public
after a very limited period of ownership." 239 The patent is intended, first and
foremost, to encourage inventors to invent; it is not intended to be treated
itself as property. 240 The patent law issues being debated in Western nations
indicate that patent protection is not deemed to be a fundamental right in
Western society: issues such as how to minimize abuses of the monopoly it
creates 241 while improving its ability to accomplish its goal;242 whether
certain commodities or processes should be given different treatment 243-for
238 Patent protection is a special protection offered to the inventor in exchange for full disclosure of
the invention. The alternative for the inventor is to keep all of this information secret, in which case there
is an unlimited exclusivity of use, unless another person makes the same discovery or learns of the
information in a legitimate manner. In the United States, such information is protected by the common
law on trade secrets. See American Legal Institute, 4 Restatement of the Law of Torts § 757 (ALI
Publishers, 1939). For the law in England hod the Commonwealth, see Hammond, The Origins of the
Equitable Duty of Confidence, 8 Anglo-Am L Rev 71 (1979).
239 Howard G. Fox, The Canadian Law and Practice Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions I
(Carswell, 1969).
240 Property in ideas is protected by the law as long as the holder of the idea does not divulge it to
the public. Conversely, to obtain a patent, one must disclose the idea to the public; that is how society
benefits. Patent law has been described as a social contract between the inventor and the state. The
inventor reveals all the details of the discovery or invention; in exchange, the state grants the inventor the
exclusive right to that invention for a limited period. This rationale is clearly stated in Uphoffl
Intellectual Property and U.S. Relations at 5 (cited in note 1). In light of this concept, it is interesting to
consider the following passage from R. Michael Gadbaw, Intellectual Property and International Trade:
Merger ofMarriage of Convenience? 22 Vand J Transnatl L 223, 224 (1989): "For most developing and
many developed countries, intellectual property is seen less as a body of fundamental rights than as a
subset of their general economic policies, to be managed for their contribution to economic growth and
industrial development" This view would seem to embody the philosophy underlying patent protection in
the United States.
241 Efforts to limit potential abuses have been part of patent regimes since they were first developed.
See Fox at 540 (cited in note 239). He points out that one of the most important limits on the right are a
requirement that the patent holder "work" the invention in the country.
242 Shepherd points out that "the patent system is capricious because it confers large rewards that
may bear no systematic relation to efficient incentives. By permitting monopoly in return for uncertain
social benefits, the system may be socially costly." Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization
at 162 (cited in note 170). No country has an ideal, efficient patent system, but Western nations have
made the policy decision that a period of exclusivity of up to twenty years is, overall, worth the cost of a
monopoly. That decision does not preclude further thinking about how to improve the system, however.
243 The former Federal Republic of Germany did not provide patents for food, chemical and
pharmaceutical products until 1968. Japan did not do so until 1987. Pharmaceutical products were not
patentable until 1992. Patentees in Japan, Spain and Switzerland have no exclusive right of importation,
a right that West Germany did not grant until 1978. See Dhanjee and Boisson de Chazournes, 24:5 J
World Trade 5 at 8 (cited in note 168).
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example, pharmaceuticals; 244 and the underlying debate about the very nature
and origin of patent protection.245
Patent law, then, is not as clear-cut a moral issue as many
commentators suggest. The United States' patent system developed in the
context of its own economic and social conditions; so, too, should the Thai
system. Thus the position of the PMA and others who decry the injustice of
the Thai patent system is untenable.
G. Liberalization vs. Protectionism
The PMA has begun to suffer a decline in profits in part due to
increasingly restrictive legislation being passed by U.S. legislators who are
displeased with the side effect of a monopoly on the marketing of a new drug:
high prices. 246 Congressional activism on this domestic issue parallels an
increasing concern about competition from foreign companies in the
traditional pharmaceuticals markets as well as, more recently, Thai markets.
Such concerns are reasonable, but they do not justify the unfair structure of
244 John W. Rogers III, The Revised Canadian Patent Act, the Free Trade Agreement, and
Pharmaceutical Patents: An Overview of Pharmaceutical Compulsory Licensing in Canada, 10 Eur Intell
Prop Rev 351, 351 (1990). Canada has long wrestled with the difficulties in granting a monopoly in the
use or sale of a new drug. Article concluded that the compulsory licensing provisions in place at the time
were inadequate in ensuring both the availability of drugs at a low price and a fair reward to the inventor.
It recommended that patents for drugs be abolished. Today Canada seems to have relented to U.S.
pressure by agreeing to replace its ten-year patent term and provisional compulsory licensing scheme with
full patent protection for drugs, but it remains to be seen whether the Canadian government will lift the
restrictions it adopted in 1987, the year it first provided any patent protection for drugs. These restrictions
include a requirement that drug manufacturers spend a certain percentage of revenue on research and
development, and a Board to review prices. See note 26 and Rod Mickleburgh, Generic drugs in danger,
group says, The [Toronto] Globe & Mail A2 (Dec 19, 1991). The United States, too, may see some form
of drug price controls in the near future. See notes 23, 25 and 27.24 5 See the following three articles in Wroe Anderson, Ven Terpsta and Stanley J. Shapiro, eds,
Patents and Progress: The Sources and Impact ofAdvancing Technology (Richard D. Irwin, 1965). The
first, George E. Frost, Patent Rights and the Stimulation of Technical Change, at 61, emphasizes that
society grants the exclusivity to the inventor for the benefit of society. The second article describes the
policy behind patents in the United States as being the same as the British policy-patents are issued "for
the good of the realm." Emilio Q. Daddario, Legislative Problems in the Field of Patents and Patent
Policy at 87. W. Halder Fisher, in A Note on the Meaning of Patents 99 at 100 states that "the whole
purpose of a patent was, is and must be to convey to a subject (i.e., a private party) a restricted version of a
right already possessed by the sovereign (government)." In the United States, "Constitutional Convention
realized the need for fostering inventiveness for the economic well-being of the future nation and decided
that Congress should have the power and the duty to promote the progress of science and the arts by
securing to inventors and authors exclusive (for a period) rights to their own works." Id at 101. All of the
authors refer to the U.S. Constitution: "The Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for a limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8.2 4 6 See O'Reilly, 124 Fortune 48 (cited in note 23).
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Section 337 or the coercive use of Section 301. Although both of these
international trade mechanisms have been promoted as tools for the
liberalization of world trade,247 they function more like protective devices for
the promotion of U.S. industries over foreign. 248
While Section 301 can conceivably be used to retaliate against
countries that discriminate against the United States, and thus is not as clearly
protectionist as, say, import tariffs or quotas designed to protect U.S.
industries against unsubsidized foreign competitors, it is not in fact being used
for that purpose, since Thailand has not discriminated against the United
States with regard to pharmaceutical patents. Thai Patent Act affords no drug
manufacturer patent protection, whether U.S., British, French, or Thai.
Thailand's lack of patent protection may allow Thai firms to copy drugs
patented in other countries, but it does not prevent brand-name or generic
U.S. firms from entering the Thai market and competing with Thai
companies; thus the omission is not even an "infant industry" shield. It
simply does not grant those firms a monopoly in Thailand. Yet the United
States has brought its demands into the Uruguay Round of the GATT,
claiming that Thailand treats U.S. drug companies unfairly and is distorting
trade with its backward laws.249
Nor should drug exports from Thailand to the United States that
infringe U.S. patents be used as a pretext to threaten Thailand with Section
301. The PMA and ITC have proper recourse in U.S. courts. Such
infringements can also be handled by means of a Section 337 hearing; this
should not be conducted with rules that would reduce the hearing to an ex
parte injunction by the Commissioner on behalf of the complainant drug
247 See, for example, Milner, The Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy at 168-69 (cited in note
224); and Judith H. Bello and Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of
the Amendments to Section 301, in Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh T. Patrick, eds, Aggressive Unilateralism:
America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System 89 (U Mich Press, 1990).
248 Milner, The Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy at 169-71. See also Jagdish Bhagwati,
Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in Bhagwati and Patrick, Aggressive Unilateralisin at 4 (cited in
note 220). Indeed, elements of Section 337 violate the GAIT golden rule: national treatment. See the
Akzo dispute (cited in note 76).
249 Compare the supposed inequity of § 9 of Thailand's Patent Act with U.S. initiatives like the
Farm Bill of 1985, which was intended to expand "U.S. agricultural exports, including rice, on the world
market through increased competitiveness brought about by price subsidization." Thailand copes with
effects of U.S. Farm Act, 5 Thailand Foreign Affairs Newsletter 1 (1986). Because rice is Thailand's
"foremost economic crop," the Farm Bill was a considerable blow for Thailand's rice export industry. Id.
The Newsletter also states that "[t]he U.S. action in massively subsidizing its rice exports not only
contradicts the purpose and objective of GATT, but contradicts the oft repeated U.S. ideal of free and fair
trade practice." Id at 2. Thailand has considerable protective devices of its own (see C. Goldstein, Out of
Service, Far Eastern Economic Review 58 (Aug 16, 1990)), but it did not have rice subsidies in 1986, and
the U.S. description of its patent law as discriminatory and distorting is inaccurate.
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company, however.
The United States government has managed to avoid the protectionist
label by turning attention to the lack of patent protection in Thailand and
other developing countries, charging that "inadequate" intellectual property
protection is a protectionist trade distortion. 250 Rather than appear as the
neighborhood bully, forcing less economically powerfiil countries to adopt
laws favorable to its interests, 251 the United States has sought to characterize
those countries as trade offenders to be dealt with in the GATT negotiations.
The United States has conducted itself in GATT, however, in the same
manner as in its bilateral dealings with Thailand and other countries. While
the United States has made legitimate trade concessions in the GATT, many
of its demands are based on the same strategy the United States has employed
in its bilateral talks with Thailand-agree to what we want and we will amend
Section 337 and won't use Section 301; fail to do so, and Section 301 will be
applied.
IV. CONCLUSION
The tactics the United States chose in negotiating patent protection for
pharmaceuticals in Thailand are inappropriate and potentially damaging to
U.S. interests. Declining profits and the threat of price controls in the United
250 It is somewhat unclear what is meant by "trade distortion." In Thailand's case, it is clear that
the lack of patent protection is not discriminatory-no one, regardless of country of origin, can obtain a
patent for a drug there. Nor is it a barrier-U.S. drug manufacturers can export their products to Thailand
just as any other country. What they can't do is prevent anyone else from selling the same type of drug in
Thailand. This may be distortive in the way that differing antitrust laws between trading countries can be
distortive, which is why bilateral arrangements and free trade agreements like the North American Free
Trade Agreement often provide for the coordination of such regulatory activity and for harmonization of
the law. See the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), part 5, ch 15, art 1501; and George
N. Addy, International Coordination of Competition Policies (Paper delivered to the HWWA-Institut fur
Wirtschaftsforschung-Hamburg, Hamburg, October 9-11, 1991) (Bureau of Competition Policy, Canada,
1991). Free trade agreements also often include provisions on intellectual property law; in the NAFTA,
see part 6. That does not make them an obvious subject of the GATT, however, unless, that is, every
aspect of national economic regulation among GAIT member nations should be under the GAT. Nor
does it justify unilateral trade sanctions designed to coerce other nations into adopting the same patent
laws as the United States.
251 The United States has not succeeded in eluding this label within Southeast Asia. See Editorial,
No such thing as bilateral free trade, Asiaweek 30 (Oct 30, 1992) (noting that "Washington's bluster
about free trade is a sideshow. Its sudden enthusiasm for 'bilateral free trade'-just when GATT is stirring
again-is as much evidence as any trader needs that what it really wants is 'managed trade'. If it's
bilateral, it can't be free, and Asians should have nothing to do with it."). This editorial, issuing from
Hong Kong, suggests that the United States has done significant harm to its image as the champion of free
trade and free trade discussions. See also Free trade's fading champion, The Economist 65 (Apr 11,
1992).
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States have prompted members of the PMA to pressure the United States
government to push for patent protection for drugs in Thailand and other
developing countries. The United States government has adopted the PMA's
position on patents, streamlined Section 337, strengthened Section 301 and
used the threat of unilateral sanctions under the GSP or Section 301 to coerce
the Thai government into amending the Patent Act to provide patent
protection for drugs, despite strong opposition in Thailand to the
amendments. The PMA, moreover, seems confident in its position, and with
its political clout the process of pressuring Thailand is likely to continue,
particularly given the PMA's disapproval of the GATT agreement.
252
There are several reasons why the U.S. position and tactics are
unreasonable. Thailand is not yet ready for drug patents; in any event, it
should be Thailand's decision when the country will be ready to protect new
drugs. The United States' coercive tactics in its bilateral negotiations violate
the principle of trade, because coercion is not an exchange. Moreover, the
United States' labeling of Thailand a violator of international standards of
moral propriety is unfounded. The U.S. position, far from being one of trade
liberalization, is actually a product of protectionist sentiment in the U.S.
Congress.
In positing that the U.S. tactics in bilateral and multilateral trade
negotiations are misguided and will damage both U.S. and Thai long-term
interests, it is my hope to bring attention to the dangers in such strong-arm
tactics and persuade the commentators and United States government to
approach the matter of developing patent laws in Thailand with greater
sensitivity and foresight. Regrettably, the United States government position
seems to be that the benefits from its tactics will far outweigh any harm.
While predictions in that regard are necessarily speculative, this analysis
indicates that the long-term consequences of such tactics may well be a
deterioration of amicable diplomatic relations between the two countries, with
Thailand trying to strengthen its ties with other nations in order to rely less on
trade with the United States. Further, as the ASEAN Free Trade Area
develops (AFTA) and grows stronger, the United States may be facing an
antagonistic trading bloc in South East Asia, one that is reluctant to enter into
trade negotiations with the country that they view as a bully.
Given its success with Section 301 and its other unilateral trade
sanctions, the United States government and special interests are likely to
252 GAT GATT Intellectual Property Text Called "Unacceptable" To Pharmaceutical Pirms, 9
Intl Trade Rep 642 (Apr 8, 1992).
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continue to use them to gain an advantage in the turbulent international trade
climate. Although a GATT intellectual property treaty, and therefore any
international treaty, seems in jeopardy at the time of this writing,253 one can
still argue that problems arising in connection with the trade-related aspects
of intellectual property rights and the developing countries should be resolved
through WIPO and a new set of Conventions. A multilateral treaty designed
to take effect in progressive stages, as increases in the level of development
and preparedness of the country warrant, would be a more appropriate and, in
the long run, effective means of achieving the desired results. Each country
could sign the next stage when it felt ready, via a special world intellectual
property tribunal overseen by WIPO.254
Meanwhile, GATT should remain the appropriate forum for intellectual
property issues to the extent that a country's intellectual property laws
genuinely discriminate against foreign nationals. GATT guidelines outlining
potentially distorting effects of intellectual property protection would help
countries avoid TRIPs 255 pitfalls. Finally, true bilateral negotiations would
allow countries to work out specific intellectual property problems or
disputes. Unfortunately, such proposals as this have, for the most part, been
rejected by the United States, the European Community and Japan. The
climate of world trade has become confrontational in the past decade.
There is more than one way to look at the issue of drug patents. A fair,
reasoned debate about this and other intellectual property issues is what is
needed-dialogue, not demands; negotiation, not extortion. One can only
hope that such debate has not become obsolete in the context of intellectual
property protection and international trade.
253 Id.
254 Some commentators have argued that economic development occurs in stages. At early stages,
copying of inventions and ideas is necessary to foster development. The more advanced the economy
becomes, the less copying is required. See Caplan, Counterfeiting Asians Under Siege, Asian Bus 16, 17
(May 1988). The stages of a treaty could follow the five levels of protection defined in Rapp and Rozek,
24:5 J World Trade 75 (cited in note 169).
255 "Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights."
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